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(I) 
 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
In the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthoriza-
tion Act (TVPRA), Congress provided a private right 
of action to victims of child sex trafficking against those 
who knowingly participate in the trafficking venture.  
Massachusetts provides a similar cause of action 
against those who “knowingly aid[]” such a venture.  
Petitioners are child sex trafficking victims who were 
trafficked through Backpage.com, which is owned and 
operated by respondents.  Petitioners sued respondents 
under the TVPRA and its state analogue for their role 
in promoting, facilitating, and aiding the trafficking of 
petitioners.  The First Circuit held that even if peti-
tioners had plausibly alleged a cause of action under the 
TVPRA and state law, Section 230(c)(1) of the Commu-
nications Decency Act (CDA) made respondents “im-
mune” from liability.  Section 230(c)(1) provides that no 
internet service provider “shall be treated as the pub-
lisher or speaker” of internet content that was “provid-
ed by another.”  The First Circuit held that petitioners’ 
claims “treated” respondents as a “publisher or speak-
er” of “information provided by another” for purposes 
of Section 230(c)(1) because online advertisements cre-
ated by third-party traffickers were a “but-for” cause 
of petitioners’ injuries.  The question presented is: 
Whether Section 230 of the CDA precludes a civil 
lawsuit against a website owner and operator based on 
its own criminal conduct any time online content creat-
ed by a third party was a part of the chain of causation 
leading to the plaintiff’s injuries. 
  
 
 
(II) 
 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Petitioners Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Jane 
Doe No. 3, Sam Loe, and Sara Loe were the plaintiffs in 
the District Court and the appellants in the Court of 
Appeals.  
Respondents Backpage.com LLC, Camarillo Hold-
ings, LLC, and New Times Media, LLC were the de-
fendants in the District Court and the appellees in the 
Court of Appeals.  
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(1) 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
No. _____ 
JANE DOE ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. 
BACKPAGE.COM LLC, ET AL. 
      
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 
Petitioners Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Jane 
Doe No. 3, Sam Loe, and Sara Loe respectfully petition 
for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
this case. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App., infra, 
1a-33a) is reported at 817 F.3d 12.  The opinion of the 
District Court granting respondents’ motion to dismiss 
(App., infra, 34a-67a) is reported at 104 F. Supp. 3d 149. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals entered judgment on March 
14, 2016.  The court denied Doe’s timely petition for re-
hearing en banc on May 3, 2016.  See App., infra, 68a-
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69a.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
1254(1). 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The relevant statutes are the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230; the Trafficking 
Victims Protection and Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. 1591 and 1595; and the Massachu-
setts Anti-Human Trafficking and Victim Protection 
Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50(d). 
The relevant provisions of the statutes are repro-
duced in full in the appendix (App., infra, 70a-80a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
 This petition involves a statutory provision—
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA)—that Congress enacted in 1996 to protect in-
ternet service providers (ISPs) serving as passive in-
termediaries of online content from liability for claims 
that treat them as a traditional publisher.  47 U.S.C. 
230(c)(1).  The First Circuit applied Section 230 to pre-
clude petitioners’ claims alleging affirmative conduct by 
an ISP itself that violated federal and state anti-
trafficking statutes, specifically the federal Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. 1591(a), and the Massachusetts 
Anti-Trafficking Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 265, § 50(d).    
 Petitioners brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts, under the 
TVPRA and MATA alleging that respondents had 
knowingly profited from aiding and participating with 
traffickers in the sexual exploitation of children by in-
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tentionally creating an online marketplace to facilitate 
the trafficking.  App., infra, 35a-40a.  The district court 
granted respondents motion to dismiss, concluding that 
Section 230 of the CDA barred petitioners’ claims un-
der the TVPRA and MATA.  The First Circuit af-
firmed, holding that, even assuming respondents direct-
ly violated the TVPRA and MATA, petitioners’ claims 
under those statutes “treated” respondents “as a pub-
lisher” under Section 230(c)(1), because advertisements 
that third-party traffickers created were part of the 
chain of causation that led to petitioners’ injuries.   
 The First Circuit’s decision conflicts with several 
decisions of the Ninth Circuit rejecting the “chain of 
causation” principle adopted by the First Circuit.  Ad-
ditionally, the decision conflicts with a September 2015 
decision of the Washington Supreme Court in a nearly 
identical case brought against these same respondents.  
Finally, the First Circuit disregards the guidance pro-
vided by this Court in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-
Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014), and other cases about 
the need to harmonize  intersecting statutes. 
A. Statutory Provisions 
1. Section 230 of the CDA 
Section 230 of the CDA provides that no ISP de-
fendant “shall be treated as the publisher or speaker” 
of Internet content that was “provided by another.”  47 
U.S.C. 230(c)(1).  Passed in 1996, the CDA represents 
an effort by Congress to regulate access to indecent or 
obscene content on the Internet.  Congress was addi-
tionally motivated by the then-recent New York state 
court decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
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1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137, as recognized in 
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 
1011, 1016 (2011).  In Stratton Oakmont, an Internet 
service provider was held liable for a third party’s li-
belous statements posted on a neutral message board.  
Id. at *6-7.  The court determined that, because the in-
teractive computer service Prodigy sometimes “deleted 
* * * distasteful third-party postings” that appeared on 
Prodigy-owned bulletin boards, Prodigy was subject to 
strict, common law “publisher’s liability” for defamato-
ry content that any one of its millions of users might 
choose to post on any one of Prodigy’s numerous online 
bulletin boards.  FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2009).  Concerned that Stratton 
Oakmont would deter ISPs from exercising any edito-
rial control over potentially offensive third-party con-
tent, Congress passed Section 230 to remove traditional 
publisher liability for ISPs who acted in good faith to 
remove or restrict such content.  See H.R. Rep. No. 
458, at 194 (1996), 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (stating that 
specific purpose of Section 230(c)(1) was to overrule 
Stratton Oakmont); 141 Cong. Rec. 22044-22045 (1995) 
(amendment offered by Rep. Cox).  Senator Coats, one 
of the two main authors of the CDA, made clear while 
discussing Section 230 that its intention was to prevent 
ISPs that try to keep offensive material off the Inter-
net “from being held liable as a publisher for defamato-
ry statements for which they would not otherwise have 
been liable.”  141 Cong. Rec. S8345 (daily ed. June 14, 
1995) (statement of Sen. Coats).   
Given its historical context, courts have accepted 
that the wording of Section 230(c)(1) has its roots in the 
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common law of defamation, which “treats as publishers” 
those who participate, either intentionally or negligent-
ly, in the communication of a defamatory matter to a 
person other than the person defamed.  See Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts §§ 577, 581 (1977).  In fact, early 
decisions applying Section 230 generally arose out of 
facts similar to those that inspired its passage.  See, 
e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).  Federal 
courts have generally agreed, however, that Section 
230 is not limited to defamation claims and “does more 
than just overrule Stratton Oakmont.”  Accusearch, 570 
F.3d at 1195.  In those instances where courts have 
specifically interpreted the phrase “treat[] as the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information provided by anoth-
er,” they have concluded that it bars claims that seek to 
impose liability solely on the basis of a website opera-
tor’s “exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial func-
tions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
2. TVPRA 
In 2000, Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act.  The statute represents a congressional 
effort to criminalize conduct related to human traffick-
ing.  Reauthorized five times—in 2003,1 2005, 2008, 2011 
and 2013—the TVPRA imposes severe penalties on any 
person who, inter alia, knowingly engages in traffick-
ing of children for the purposes of engaging in “a com-
mercial sex act.”  18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(2).  Significantly, 
                                                 
1 In 2003, Congress reauthorized the statute, which then be-
came known as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act. 
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since 2003, the TVPRA has included a civil enforcement 
provision that allows victims to “bring a civil action 
against the perpetrator in an appropriate district court 
of the United States” and to “recover damages and rea-
sonable attorneys fees.”  18 U.S.C. 1595 (2003).  The 
TVPRA does not impose liability for “publishing” in-
formation.   
In 2008, Congress amended the TVPRA to broaden 
its reach.  The Wilberforce Amendments expanded 
criminal liability to anyone who “benefits, financially or 
by receiving anything of value, from participation in 
[the underlying sex trafficking] venture” that “provides 
[or] obtains” a child for a commercial sex act either 
knowingly or in “reckless disregard” of the fact that the 
victim is a minor.  18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1) and (2).  The 
statute’s private right of action was also expanded to 
give victims, like petitioners, the right to pursue a civil 
claim against any persons who “knowingly benefit[] fi-
nancially * * * from participation in [the underlying sex 
trafficking] venture.”  See 18 U.S.C. 1595.  This private 
right of action provision makes clear that, to be civilly 
liable for participating in a child sex trafficking ven-
ture, a defendant need not have been the “perpetrator” 
of the trafficking.  Ibid. (no longer requiring defendant 
to be “perpetrator”).  
The legislative history of the TVPRA confirms 
Congress’ intention to expand the reach of the statute. 
In explaining the need for its amendments, one senator 
stated, “[I]t is our job to once again be a beacon of pro-
gress and hope and no longer allow one man to profit 
from the suffering of another.”  153 Cong. Rec. H14098, 
H14120 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007).  About these expansive 
amendments, then-Senator Biden stated that they “es-
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tablish[ed] some powerful new legal tools, including in-
creasing the jurisdiction of the courts, enhancing penal-
ties for trafficking offenses, punishing those who profit 
from trafficked labor and ensuring restitution of for-
feited assets to victims.”  154 Cong. Rec. S4798, S4799 
(daily ed. May 22, 2008). 
3. MATA 
 Passed in 2011, the MATA is an example of the sus-
tained national effort to comprehensively address the 
problem of human trafficking at the state level.  See 
generally Melissa Dess, Walking the Freedom Trail: 
An Analysis of the Massachusetts Human Trafficking 
Statute, 33 B.C.J.L. & Soc. Just. 147, 151 (2013).  Like 
its federal analogue, the MATA not only includes crim-
inal penalties, but also provides victims with a private 
right of action.  Under the MATA’s private right of ac-
tion, a victim is entitled to sue not only the individuals 
who forced her to engage in commercial sex, but also 
“[a]ny business entity that knowingly aid[ed] * * * [the] 
joint venture[]” that trafficked her “for sexual servi-
tude.”  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265 § 50(d). 
B. Respondents’ Participation In Child Sex 
Trafficking 
 Respondents own and operate Backpage.com, a 
website that hosts more than 80 percent of the online 
advertising for illegal commercial sex in the United 
States.  Each day, several hundred thousand adver-
tisements are posted on the “Escorts” section of Back-
page.com.  Respondents charge money for the “Escort” 
advertisements, reaping more than one million dollars 
in profits annually from them.  A significant portion of 
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the advertisements on Backpage.com features children 
that sex traffickers hold out for sale.  
 As petitioners alleged in their complaint, respond-
ents are not merely passively aware that illegal com-
mercial sex ventures operate over Backpage.com.  Ra-
ther, respondents have engaged in affirmative conduct 
designed to support such ventures (including those that 
exploit children).  Petitioners’ complaint alleged, among 
other things, that respondents (1) steer traffickers to-
ward advertising language that will avoid law enforce-
ment detection; (2) accept and indeed encourage non-
traditional payment methods that render virtually un-
traceable the financial transactions between respond-
ents and the traffickers that advertise their victims 
over Backpage.com; (3) strip metadata, including geolo-
cation information, from photographs that traffickers 
upload to Backpage.com to entice potential customers, 
which hinders law enforcement’s ability to locate vic-
tims and apprehend their traffickers; (4) intentionally 
delete from Backpage.com “sting ads” that law en-
forcement places on Backpage.com, which aids traffick-
ing ventures’ profitability by eliminating a potential 
customer deterrent; (5) host and facilitate private 
communications between traffickers and customers re-
garding illegal sex transactions; and (6) feign coopera-
tion with law enforcement while refusing to use tech-
niques that could identify and locate children being sold 
for sex.2  App., infra, 4a-7a.  Respondents take all of 
                                                 
2 The plausibility of Plaintiffs’ allegations of criminal wrong-
doing are supported by developments in the ongoing investigation 
of Backpage.com by the U.S. Senate, including the preliminary 
conclusions of subcommittee staff, the assertion by the Back-
page.com CEO and two of its employees of their Fifth Amendment 
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these actions in pursuit of their own profit; if the under-
lying sex trafficking ventures flourish, the traffickers 
will post more advertisements on Backpage.com and be 
willing to pay more to post them, which directly trans-
lates into more advertising dollars for respondents.    
C. The Present Litigation 
1. Petitioners 
 Beginnings at age 15, petitioners were illegally 
trafficked for sex through Backpage.com.  Jane Doe No. 
1 was trafficked across Massachusetts and Rhode Is-
land on Backpage.com in 2012 and 2013.  She was sold 
and raped 10-12 times per day by men responding to 
the advertisements.  Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked 
across Massachusetts on Backpage.com from 2010 
through 2012.  She was advertised an average of 6 
times per day and was sold and raped by 5 to 15 cus-
tomers a day.  Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked on Back-
page.com in 2013.  She was driven to a hotel in Massa-
chusetts, where she was raped in exchange for payment 
that went to her trafficker.  As a direct result of these 
sex trafficking ventures, petitioners have suffered se-
vere physical and psychological injuries.  
 In order to hold respondents responsible for their 
conduct and the injuries that conduct caused, petition-
                                                                                                    
privilege against self-incrimination, and the determination by the 
Senate to hold Backpage.com’s CEO in contempt.  See Staff of S. 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 114th Cong., Recommen-
dation to Enforce a Subpoena Issued to the CEO of Backpage.com, 
LLC 1, 10, 30-33 (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov 
/subcommittees/investigations/reports; see also Application to En-
force Subpoena, Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations v. 
Ferrer, No. 1:16-mc-621 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2016). 
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ers filed a civil action against respondents in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.  
Petitioners’ complaint included causes of action under 
the TVPRA and the MATA.  Petitioners’ complaint in-
cluded detailed factual allegations about respondents’ 
own knowing, purposeful business conduct that is de-
signed to and does solicit, encourage, promote, and pro-
tect the sex trafficking ventures that serve as an en-
gine of Backpage.com’s profitability. 
2. The District Court and First Circuit Pro-
ceedings 
 Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners’ com-
plaint, arguing that Section 230 of the CDA provided 
them immunity from civil liability.  Respondents ar-
gued that, because third-party traffickers were the 
ones who authored and posted the advertisements that 
shopped petitioners to potential customers, petitioners’ 
lawsuit “treated” respondents “as the publisher or 
speaker” of “information provided by another” and was 
therefore barred by Section 230.  The district court 
agreed with respondents and dismissed petitioners’ 
lawsuit.  App., infra, 67a. 
Petitioners timely appealed.  On March 14, 2016, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.  The panel 
acknowledged that the CDA and TVPRA “do not fit 
together seamlessly, and this case reflects the tension 
between them.”  App., infra, 3a.  The court wrote that 
Congress enacted the CDA, in part, in response to 
court cases that had held internet publishers liable for 
defamatory content posted by third parties on the pub-
lishers’ message boards.  Still, it concluded that there 
had been “near-universal agreement” that the CDA 
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should not be construed “grudgingly” and to do other-
wise could have a “chilling effect.”  Id. at 10a. 
The First Circuit found that petitioners’ complaint 
made a “persuasive case” that respondents purposeful-
ly tailored Backpage.com to “make sex trafficking easi-
er.”  App. infra, 32a-33a.   The First Circuit concluded, 
however, that even if petitioners’ complaint plausibly 
alleged that respondents had violated the federal and 
state criminal anti-trafficking laws, petitioners’ causes 
of action “treated” respondents as the “publisher or 
speaker” of online advertisements that third-party traf-
fickers created, and therefore those claims were barred 
by Section 230(c)(1).  Id. at 11a-15a.  The court ex-
plained that the advertisements that petitioners’ traf-
fickers posted on Backpage.com were what provided a 
connection between respondents’ own violations of the 
federal and state anti-trafficking statutes on the one 
hand and petitioners’ injuries on the other.  In other 
words, “information provided by another” linked the 
chain of causation that led to petitioners’ injuries.  This, 
the First Circuit reasoned, was sufficient to trigger 
Section 230(c)(1)’s bar.  Id. at 11a.  
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
The First Circuit’s decision immunizes website 
owners and operators, such as respondents, from civil 
liability whenever online content created by a third 
party was a part of the chain of causation leading to the 
plaintiff’s injury—even if there are plausible allegations 
that the website owner and operator’s own criminal 
conduct contributed to her injury.  The First Circuit’s 
broad construction of Section 230 conflicts with several 
decisions of the Ninth Circuit that expressly reject the 
reasoning of the First Circuit, as well as with decisions 
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of other circuits which align with the Ninth Circuit in 
carefully confining the CDA to “neutral intermediar-
ies.” The First Circuit’s decision also directly conflicts 
with a September 2015 decision of the Washington Su-
preme Court in a case involving a nearly identical set of 
facts that a nearly identical set of plaintiffs brought 
against these same respondents.   
The conflict between the First Circuit and these 
other courts follows from a failure to attempt to harmo-
nize the CDA with the criminal statutes underling peti-
tioners’ claims.  The consequence is that the federal and 
state trafficking statutes have been effectively set 
aside without any effort to determine whether Con-
gress intended that the CDA would undermine its own 
anti-trafficking efforts in that manner.  More careful 
analysis of the language and context of each statute 
demonstrates that they can operate together in a man-
ner that fulfills the important purposes of each. 
This petition represents an ideal vehicle for this 
Court to address Section 230 of the CDA and to provide 
the lower courts guidance on how to construe and apply 
this provision.  First, the court of appeals held below 
that Section 230 barred petitioners’ lawsuit against re-
spondents, even assuming that petitioners’ complaint 
stated a plausible claim that respondents have engaged 
in purposeful and knowing conduct that violates federal 
and state criminal anti-trafficking laws that include 
private rights of action.  The court of appeals’ construc-
tion and application of Section 230 was therefore out-
come determinative of petitioners’ appeal.  Second, the 
stakes here are high.  The gravamen of petitioners’ 
complaint is that respondents violated federal and state 
criminal law—namely, the TVPRA and the MATA.  
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Congress and the Massachusetts legislature each de-
termined that, in addition to criminal penalties, private 
rights of action are an essential part of the anti-
trafficking enforcement scheme.  The First Circuit’s 
decision strips petitioners of their right to hold re-
spondents civilly liable for the injuries that their crimi-
nal conduct caused, and thereby  impairs the enforce-
ment scheme that Congress and the Massachusetts leg-
islature so carefully crafted. 
I. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S BROAD CONSTRUCTION 
OF CDA IMMUNITY CONFLICTS WITH OTHER 
COURTS AND WITH GUIDANCE FROM THIS 
COURT ON THE INTERPRETATION OF INTER-
SECTING STATUTES 
A. The First Circuit’s Broad Reading Of The 
CDA Conflicts With The More Limited Con-
struction Given It By Other Courts 
1. The Ninth Circuit Rejects the First Cir-
cuit’s “causation” construction of the 
CDA 
 The Ninth Circuit, which has the most developed 
jurisprudence concerning Section 230, construes that 
provision far more narrowly than the First Circuit 
does.  In particular, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly re-
jected the First Circuit’s view that the mere presence 
of third-party content in the chain of causation leading 
to a plaintiff’s injury necessarily triggers Section 230.  
In stark contrast to the First Circuit’s approach, the 
Ninth Circuit has instead looked beyond the presence 
of third-party content to the particular nature of the 
claims at issue to determine whether Section 230 ap-
plies.  Other courts of appeals have agreed with the 
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Ninth Circuit that liability can lie against an ISP that 
acts as more than a mere passive intermediary, even 
where third-party content played some role in the al-
leged injury. 
 In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a website operator could be 
held liable for its own conduct that violated a “law[] of 
general applicability.”  521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (2008).  
The court explained that, “even if the [challenged] in-
formation originated with a user,” the party “responsi-
ble for putting [that] information online may be subject 
to liability” if, in the process of doing so, the ISP’s own 
conduct makes it “more than a passive transmitter of 
information provided by others.”  Id. at 1165-1166.  The 
court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ allegations sought 
to hold Roommates.com liable for its “own acts,” which 
were “entirely its doing.”  Id. at 1165.  In other words, 
the fact that third-party content appeared in the chain 
of causation did not decide the matter.  If the result 
were otherwise, the Ninth Circuit noted, such an inter-
pretation of Section 230 would stray far beyond con-
gressional intent: “The Communications Decency Act 
was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the 
Internet.”  Id. at 1164. 
 The next year, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that a defendant could not rely on 
Section 230 to defend against a promissory estoppel 
claim where the defendant had promised the plaintiff 
that it would remove certain third-party content from 
its website but then failed to do so.  See 570 F.3d 1096, 
1099, 1107-1109 (2009).  The promissory estoppel claim, 
the court explained, did not “seek to hold Yahoo liable 
as a publisher or speaker of third-party content.”  Id. at 
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1107.  That is, the claim was not based on Yahoo acting 
as a passive intermediary, nor did it seek to impute the 
content of the third-party speech to Yahoo.  Rather, the 
claim alleged that Yahoo had acted “as the counter-
party to a contract, as a promisor who has breached.”  
Ibid.  Even though the plaintiff would not have suffered 
injury but for the third party’s original act of posting 
the content, the court held that this fact did not bar the 
plaintiff’s claim.  Instead, what mattered was that the 
claim sought to hold the ISP liable for its own conduct 
in violation of contract law. 
 Most recently, in Jane Doe No. 14 v. Internet 
Brands, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the reason-
ing of Roommates.com and Barnes by explicitly holding 
that a claim was not barred by Section 230 simply be-
cause publication of third-party content on a website 
was part of the chain of causation leading to the injury.  
See 824 F.3d 846, 848, 853 (2016) (decision on rehear-
ing).  The plaintiff in Internet Brands alleged that the 
defendant website knew that two of the site’s users had 
been engaging in a scheme to lure, drug, and rape 
women by responding to postings on the site; the plain-
tiff claimed that the site’s operators had tortiously 
failed to warn the plaintiff and others like her about the 
risk of being victimized.  Id. at 848-849.  Unlike the 
First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit explained that, alt-
hough the defendant “acted as the ‘publisher or speak-
er’ of user content * * * and that action could be de-
scribed as a ‘but-for’ cause of [plaintiff’s] injuries * * * 
that does not mean the failure to warn claim seeks to 
hold [defendant] liable as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of 
user content.”  Id. at 853.  The court reaffirmed 
Barnes’s holding that “the CDA does not provide a 
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general immunity against all claims derived from third-
party content.”  Ibid.  And it further recognized that 
any concern about a “chilling effect” on Internet 
speech—such as the First Circuit expressed here, 
(App., infra, 10a)—is inapplicable in a situation like 
this: “Congress has not provided an all purpose get-out-
of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user content 
on the internet, though any claims might have a mar-
ginal chilling effect on internet publishing businesses.”  
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853. 
 The lynchpin of these decisions is the understand-
ing that Section 230, which was designed to protect 
ISPs in their capacity as “neutral intermediaries,” does 
not immunize a defendant from its own alleged viola-
tions of “laws of general applicability.”  Room-
mates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15.  The court empha-
sized that the internet “is no longer a fragile new means 
of communication that could easily be smothered in the 
cradle,” but rather “a dominant—perhaps the preemi-
nent—means through which commerce is conducted.”  
Id. at 1164 n.15.  In that context, courts must not “ex-
ceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress” 
by “giv[ing] online businesses an unfair advantage over 
their real-world counterparts,” who have to obey the 
same laws as everyone else, ibid.—including laws pro-
hibiting participation in child sex trafficking ventures.  
If a business operator in the brick-and-mortar world 
had created a marketplace for illegal sex with children, 
assisted child sex traffickers in connecting with their 
“customers,” and shielded those traffickers from law 
enforcement scrutiny—in other words, if it had done 
exactly what petitioners allege that respondents have 
done—that business would be subject to civil liability in 
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the Ninth Circuit for its participation in child sex traf-
ficking.  But not so in the First Circuit.   
2. Other circuits agree that Section 230 is 
limited to protection of ISPs serving as 
“neutral intermediaries” 
 Other courts of appeals have agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit that Section 230 must have limits, in order to 
avoid turning the internet into the “lawless no-man’s 
land” that the Roommates.com court warned against.  
521 F.3d at 1164; FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Accusearch’s actions were 
not ‘neutral’ with respect to generating offensive con-
tent; on the contrary, its actions were intended to gen-
erate such content.  Accusearch is not entitled to im-
munity under the CDA.”); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 
F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (refusing to adopt district 
court’s interpretation of Section 230, “which would read 
[that section] more broadly than any previous Court of 
Appeals decision has read it, potentially abrogating all 
state- or common-law causes of action brought against 
interactive Internet services”); Chicago Lawyers’ 
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Sec-
tion 230(c) “as a whole cannot be understood as a gen-
eral prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators 
and other online content hosts”). 
 Accordingly, the federal courts of appeal are broad-
ly aligned on the principle that Section 230 protects 
neutral intermediaries, not ISPs that, through their 
own acts, have committed a wrong against a plaintiff.3  
                                                 
3  See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (a website is immune pursuant to Section 230 if it “mere-
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This principle is particularly strong where the ISP’s 
affirmative conduct is itself against the law.  Both the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits have explicitly held that Sec-
tion 230 does not apply to non-neutral ISPs engaged in 
misconduct that violates federal statutes.  See Ac-
cusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198-99 (Section 230 did not apply 
where the ISP contributed to the unlawful conduct of 
its users in violation of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166 (ISP was 
“much more than a passive transmitter of information 
provided by others,” and was therefore liable under 
Section 230, where it required users to disclose illicit 
preferences that violated the Fair Housing Act). 
 Unlike these other circuits, the First Circuit 
adopted a “but-for” causation test that does not limit its 
application to passive intermediaries.  The First Circuit 
goes far beyond those other courts to deem a plaintiff’s 
cause of action to “treat[]” the defendant “as the pub-
lisher or speaker” of third-party content, and to be 
barred by Section 230(c)(1), wherever “there would 
[have been] no harm” to the plaintiff “but for [the third-
party] content.”  App., infra, 12a. 
                                                                                                    
ly provides a neutral means by which third parties can post infor-
mation of their own independent choosing online”); Doe v. GTE 
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an ISP was 
entitled to Section 230 immunity where its conduct was “passive”); 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding that an ISP was a neutral intermediary entitled to 
Section 230 protection because it did not contribute to the “under-
lying misinformation”); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985-986 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that an ISP was 
a neutral intermediary entitled to Section 230 protection because it 
did nothing to encourage the offensive content), cert. denied, 531 
U.S. 824 (2000). 
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 Yet petitioners’ claims under the TVPRA and the 
MATA do not “treat” respondents “as a publisher” at 
all.  Petitioners do not assert any claim that sounds in 
defamation, or that resembles defamation despite being 
asserted as a different cause of action.  These claims do 
not seek to impute another’s speech to Backpage.com.  
See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 
F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007) (claim treated defendant as 
a publisher because “any liability against [a defendant] 
must be premised on imputing to it the alleged misin-
formation” written by message board users).  Nor do 
petitioners’ TVPRA and MATA claims seek to hold 
Backpage.com liable for merely posting the advertise-
ments, or for the act of communicating the advertise-
ments.  Compare, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 
F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (under plaintiff’s claims, an 
ISP defendant would be “cast * * * in the same position 
as the party who originally posted the offensive mes-
sages”).  In other words, plaintiffs do not seek to im-
pose liability because of Backpage.com’s role as an in-
termediary.  Rather, petitioners seek to hold respond-
ents liable for their own affirmative conduct—conduct 
that ranged far beyond the “standard elements of web 
sites ‘with both lawful and unlawful potential.’ ”  Lycos, 
478 F.3d at 421 (quoting MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)); see also J.S. v. Vill. 
Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 718 (Wash. 
2015) (en banc) (explaining that Backpage’s policies, de-
signed to enable sex trafficking, are “not simply neutral 
policies prohibiting or limiting certain content”).  
 The First Circuit’s interpretation of Section 230 
would provide any website operator with an absolute 
immunity from any civil claim for a limitless range of 
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illegal conduct, provided solely that third party content 
appears somewhere in the chain of causation leading to 
the plaintiff’s injury.  Any plaintiff bringing a claim 
against a website operator in the First Circuit will 
therefore face an insuperable barrier to overcoming a 
motion to dismiss, whereas if that same claim were 
brought in a district court in the Ninth Circuit, that 
same plaintiff, with the same factual allegations and the 
same claims, would have an opportunity to take discov-
ery to prove her case. 
3. The Washington Supreme Court rejected 
a CDA defense to an identical claim to 
Petitioners’  
The conflict detailed above is not mere specula-
tion—it has already occurred in a state court of last re-
sort within the Ninth Circuit.  In September 2015, the 
Washington Supreme Court confronted a case with 
nearly identical facts to those alleged here, brought by 
similarly situated plaintiffs against the exact same de-
fendants, advancing substantively similar claims.  The 
Washington Supreme Court, following the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s lead, allowed that case to proceed to discovery.   
In J.S., as here, plaintiffs who had been trafficked 
for sex on Backpage.com while they were minors 
brought a complaint alleging that respondents had facil-
itated their sexual exploitation.  359 P.3d 714.  J.S. and 
her two co-plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs here, were raped 
multiple times while minors by adults who responded to 
Backpage.com advertisements.  Id. at 716.  J.S. brought 
suit in Washington state court alleging violations of a 
variety of state law claims, including sexual exploita-
tion of children.  Ibid.; see id. at 717 n.3.  As here, re-
spondents moved to dismiss, arguing that they were 
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immune from liability under Section 230.  Id. at 716.  
And as here, the plaintiffs responded that respondents 
were not protected from suit because their website was 
“designed to help pimps develop advertisements that 
can evade the unwanted attention of law enforcement, 
while still conveying the illegal message”—specifically, 
Backpage.com had intentionally structured its posting 
requirements in a manner that it knew would allow and 
encourage the trafficking of children for sex, and re-
spondents’ supposed preventative measures were in 
reality “a fraud and a ruse” designed to help Back-
page.com and the traffickers who use it “evade law en-
forcement by giving the [false] appearance that Back-
page.com does not allow sex trafficking on its website.”  
Id. at 716, 717-718. 
The state trial court in J.S. denied defendants’ mo-
tion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed to dis-
covery.  The defendant took an interlocutory appeal, 
and in an en banc decision, the Washington Supreme 
Court affirmed.  359 P.3d at 715-716.  Relying on the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roommates.com, the court 
held that the plaintiffs’ allegations created a plausible 
inference that respondents were not protected by Sec-
tion 230 of the CDA: where plaintiffs offered plausible 
allegations of participation in child sex trafficking, 
those allegations, if proved, would demonstrate that 
Backpage.com did more than passively “maintain neu-
tral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content,” as 
the CDA required for protection from liability.  Id. at 
717.  Under these circumstances, the court held that 
discovery was necessary to “ascertain whether in fact 
Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex traf-
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ficking,” because, if it had, the CDA would not provide 
any protection.  Ibid. 
 On almost identical allegations in the present case, 
against the same defendants as in J.S., the First Circuit 
held the opposite.  In stark contrast to the Washington 
court, the First Circuit failed to examine petitioners’ 
allegations of respondents’ participation in child sex 
trafficking.  Instead, the court of appeals assumed ar-
guendo that plaintiffs had stated a claim under the 
TVPRA’s private right of action yet did not treat that 
as determinative.  App., infra, 12a-14a.  Quite the oppo-
site—the First Circuit held that even if the petitioners 
could show that respondents violated a criminal sex 
trafficking statute, the pertinent question was whether 
third-party content played any role in the causal chain 
leading to the plaintiffs’ injuries.  See ibid.  
 The court of appeals’ holding in the present case 
creates a direct conflict with a state court of last resort.  
It is plain that the Washington Supreme Court, follow-
ing the Ninth Circuit’s lead, would have permitted peti-
tioners’ claims to survive a motion to dismiss.  Petition-
ers alleged the same conduct by the same defendants as 
in the J.S. case, and they likewise sought to hold re-
spondents liable for their participation in the sex traf-
ficking of children based on this conduct.  Yet, if J.S. 
had brought her claim in a federal district court in the 
First Circuit, that claim would not have survived a mo-
tion to dismiss.  There is thus a fundamental disagree-
ment on the question of whether a website operator can 
be held civilly liable for its own illegal conduct, specifi-
cally participation in child sex trafficking, where third-
party content is a link in the chain of causation leading 
to a plaintiff’s injuries.  This conflict produces the unac-
23 
 
 
 
 
ceptable result that the forum in which claims against 
Backpage.com are brought determines their outcome.  
B. The First Circuit’s Decision Fails To 
Properly Harmonize Intersecting Statutes   
 It is well settled that the “classic judicial task of 
reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting 
them to ‘make sense’ in combination, necessarily as-
sumes that the implications of a statute may be altered 
by the implications of a later statute.”  United States v. 
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988); see also FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 
(2000).  This is particularly so where the scope of the 
earlier statute is broad but the subsequent statutes 
more specifically address the topic at hand.  See Brown 
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143.  The courts below ig-
nored their obligation to parse the relevant statutes 
and determine if they can coexist.  See Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“The courts are not 
at liberty to pick and choose among congressional en-
actments, and when two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to 
regard each as effective.”); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001) 
(“Here we can plainly regard each statute as effective 
because of its different requirements and protections.”).   
 In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., this 
Court considered the Lanham Act and the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and found that 
a plaintiff could maintain a private right of action under 
the Lanham Act in the face of an existing FDCA regu-
latory regime.  134 S. Ct. 2288, 2238-2239 (2014).  Find-
ing that “[n]othing in the text, history, or structure of 
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the FDCA or the Lanham Act shows the congressional 
purpose or design to forbid these suits,” id. at 2233, this 
Court concluded that the “best way to harmonize the 
statutes” was to allow the appellant’s Lanham Act 
claim to proceed.  Id. at 2237.  POM Wonderful teaches 
that when two statutes are not in conflict with one oth-
er, it would “show disregard for the congressional de-
sign to hold that Congress nonetheless intended one 
federal statute to preclude the operation of the other.”  
Id. at 2238. 
 In the present case, three victims of child sex traf-
ficking seek redress against a key participant in the 
trafficking transactions that caused them grave harm.  
The relevant claims and defenses invoke, on the one 
hand, the federal TVPRA, which grants victims of sex 
trafficking ventures a private right of action, and, on 
the other hand, the CDA, enacted in 1996, which offers 
an ISP protection from claims that seek to “treat” it as 
the “publisher or speaker” of content that was created 
entirely by “another.”  The TVPRA, which was origi-
nally enacted in 2000 and was reauthorized in 2003, 
2005, 2008, 2011, and 2013, is a subsequent statute that 
“more specifically address[es] the topic at hand” than 
the CDA does.  See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 
143.  “Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a 
specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a 
general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”  
Morton, 417 U.S. at 550-551.  “Nor can it be said that 
the two statutes ‘cannot mutually coexist.’ ”  J.E.M., 534 
U.S. at 143 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 
426 U.S. 148, 155, (1976)).  In passing the TVPRA, Con-
gress likely “did not intend” that a website operator 
would be immune from civil liability under the statute’s 
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private right of action provision simply because, in ad-
dition to the website operator’s own unlawful conduct, 
online content created by a third party was also a con-
tributing “but-for” cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.  See 
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2239.  By the same to-
ken, there is nothing in the language or context of Sec-
tion 230 of the CDA that Congress intended to immun-
ize website operators from being held civilly liable for 
conduct that violates federal criminal law. 
 In arriving at its decision in POM, this Court ob-
served that general preemption principles are “instruc-
tive” even in a dispute involving federal statutes.  134 
S. Ct. at 2236.  This observation informed the careful 
and deferential attention that the Court applied to dis-
cerning Congressional intent in that case.  This ap-
proach to interpretation is dictated here not only be-
cause two federal statutes intersect, but for the addi-
tional reason that the CDA expressly preempts state 
laws that are “inconsistent” with the CDA.  See 47 
U.S.C. 230(e)(3).  The First Circuit, however, declined 
to apply preemption principles to constrain its interpre-
tation of the “treat as a publisher” language or to eval-
uate the relationship between the statutes.  
 The First Circuit acknowledged that there were 
two intersecting federal statutes at play as well as a 
parallel state statute.  App., infra, 12a-17a.  However, 
rather than construing Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA in 
a manner that would “harmonize” it with the TVPRA 
and enable the two statutes “to make sense in combina-
tion,” see Fausto, 484 U.S. at 453; POM Wonderful, 134 
S. Ct. at 2237, the First Circuit prioritized a “broad” 
interpretation of the CDA at the expense of the 
TVPRA.  Section 230(c)(1)’s plain language, however, 
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was susceptible to a narrower reading.  Indeed, full ef-
fect can be given to the “treat as a publisher” language 
of the CDA by protecting those ISPs that are neutral 
intermediaries from potential liability related to illegal 
content by third parties and by exposing to potential 
liability for their own conduct those ISPs that deliber-
ately use their websites to accomplish criminal purpos-
es.  This result would have avoided any conflict be-
tween the CDA and the TVPRA (and preserved the 
“not inconsistent” state statute as well).  Under this 
Court’s precedents, this was the reading of Section 
230(c)(1) that the First Circuit was obliged to adopt.  
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518-
520 (1992) (supporting a “narrow reading” of the outer 
limits of an express statutory preemption provision); 
see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 
(1996).   Had the First Circuit done so, no conflict would 
have arisen between it and the decisions of the Ninth 
Circuit and Washington Supreme Court.      
II. THIS IS A CASE OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE 
 This case presents the Court with an opportunity 
to address the CDA for the first time since Reno v. 
ACLU, and to resolve recurring questions concerning 
the scope of the protection from liability afforded by 
Section 230.  521 U.S. 844 (1997).  In the twenty years 
since the passage of the CDA, lower courts frequently 
have grappled with disputes over the proper interpre-
tation of the language of Section 230(c).  Despite ap-
proximately five hundred lower court decisions, includ-
ing almost fifty decisions by federal courts of appeal, 
Section 230 continues to generate controversy about 
the language and the proper mode of analysis of the 
statute.  See, e.g., Ryan J.P. Dyer, The Communication 
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Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for Renewing the Pre-
sumption Against Preemption, 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 
837 (2014); Joanna Schorr, Malicious Content on the 
Internet: Narrowing Immunity under the Communica-
tions Decency Act, 87 St. John’s L. Rev. 733, 737 (2013);  
Gregory M. Dickinson, An Interpretive Framework for 
Narrower Immunity Under Section 230 of the Com-
munications Decency Act, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
863 (2010); Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity: 
Using a Totality of the Circumstances Approach to 
Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communica-
tions Decency Act, 61 Hastings L.J. 1307 (2010).  The 
First Circuit’s decision dramatically sharpens the dif-
ferences between the lower courts by extending Sec-
tion 230 further than any other court and highlights the 
need for definitive guidance from this Court.   
A. The First Circuit’s Decision Breaks With 
The Existing Consensus Concerning The 
Breadth Of Section 230 
 In the twenty years since its passage, Section 
230(c)(1) has been cited in over 500 state and federal 
opinions.  These cases typically arise in the “heartland” 
of subject matter that Section 230 was designed to ad-
dress—that is, cases in which a plaintiff seeks to hold 
an ISP liable for the passive transmission of defamato-
ry or offensive content authored by third parties.4  Such 
cases readily fit into Section 230’s framework, because 
“publishing” is an element of a defamation claim.  See 
                                                 
4 Section 230’s specific focus on defamatory statements and 
publisher liability reflect Congress’ goal to incentivize ISPs who 
acted in good faith to remove or restrict potentially offensive con-
tent.  See H.R. Rep. No. 458, supra, at 194.  
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, §§ 577, 581 
(1977).  To date, all federal circuits have addressed Sec-
tion 230 at least once, and most of these decisions arise 
from defamation claims or allegations that sound in def-
amation against websites acting as neutral intermediar-
ies.5   
 While decisions of the Ninth Circuit and other 
courts shared a common understanding regarding the 
limitations inherent in Section 230’s scope, the First 
Circuit’s decision breaks with that consensus regarding 
the scope of the statute.  The First Circuit applied the 
protections of Section 230 where, by the court’s own 
                                                 
5 See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 
413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (claims against a message board operator 
for allegedly false and defamatory postings by pseudonymous 
posters); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 
2015) (defamation claim against neutral web hosting service Go-
Daddy.com); Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(claim against a neutral ISP for failure to prevent the publication 
of defamatory information), cert denied, 540 U.S. 877 (2003); Zeran 
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (claims 
against a neutral ISP for delay in removing defamatory messages 
posted by an unidentified third party); Jones v. Dirty World 
Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) (defamation 
claims against an ISP that operated a user-generated online tab-
loid that published third-party content); Johnson v. Arden, 614 
F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) (defamation claims against a neutral ISP 
for defamatory statements posted by third parties); Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (defamation 
claim against a neutral ISP for publication of a false profile on a 
dating website submitted by a third party); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & 
Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2000) (claim 
against a neutral ISP for defamation claims based on third-party 
postings); Dowbenko v. Google, Inc., 582 Fed. App’x 801 (11th Cir. 
2014) (defamation claim against Google, a neutral search engine, 
for defamatory search results that resulted from content on third-
party websites). 
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reasoning, the ISP at issue was not a neutral interme-
diary.  The First Circuit assumed for the purposes of its 
decision that respondents’ conduct violated the 
TVPRA, which by definition means it could not have 
been “neutral” for the purposes of Section 230 immuni-
ty.  In doing so, the First Circuit expanded Section 230 
beyond what any other court of appeals has previously 
held.  This Court’s guidance is necessary to assure that 
the application of Section 230 in cases that fall outside 
the “heartland” of defamation-like claims is faithful to 
the limited intentions of Congress and that plaintiffs 
across the county with claims such as petitioners have 
equal access to the courts.  
B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision Has Broad 
Consequences For Internet Crime Generally 
And Online Child Sex Trafficking In Partic-
ular  
The First Circuit’s opinion effectively immunizes 
an array of criminal conduct by ISPs, expanding the al-
ready broad reach of Section 230.  In a society now 
dominated by digital technology, criminal activity on 
the internet has increased markedly, and some portion 
of that activity involves affirmative wrongdoing by 
ISPs themselves.  As just one example of the Internet 
serving as a hub for criminal enterprise, the creator of 
the website “Silk Road,” who designed a “sophisticated 
and extensive [Internet] criminal marketplace” that 
enabled thousands of individuals to anonymously trans-
act in illegal drugs without detection, was convicted 
last year of seven criminal charges, including narcotics 
and money laundering conspiracies.  See United States 
v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);  
Jury Verdict, Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (Feb. 5, 2015) 
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(No. 14cr68).  The indictment alleged that Ulbricht, 
through the operation of his website, had engaged in 
“specific and intentional conduct to join with narcotics 
traffickers or computer hackers to help them sell illegal 
drugs or hack into computers, and to be involved in en-
forcing rules (including using murder-for-hire) regard-
ing such sales and taking commissions.”  31 F. Supp. 3d 
at 568.  Yet, under the First Circuit’s interpretation of 
Section 230, through that provision, Congress immun-
ized Ulbricht, a convicted federal felon, from liability to 
any person harmed by the illegal activities that took 
place via Silk Road—even, potentially, the family of a 
victim of a murder-for-hire—could not maintain a civil 
claim against Ulbricht, a convicted federal felon. 
The consequences of the First Circuit’s broad in-
terpretation are particularly troublesome for efforts to 
combat child sex trafficking.  In its reauthorizations of 
the TVPRA, Congress has been well aware that sex 
trafficking has moved from the street corner to the in-
ternet, where websites like Backpage.com create virtu-
al red light districts.  The TVPRA is a tool that Con-
gress plainly expected that the Department of Justice 
and private plaintiffs would use to expand the scope of 
enforcement to create further disincentives to sex traf-
ficking.  In particular, the TVPRA’s civil enforcement 
provision empowers victims to pursue a private right of 
action against any persons who “knowingly benefit[ ] 
financially * * * from participation in [the underlying 
sex trafficking] venture.”  18 U.S.C. 1595.  This provi-
sion expressly expands the potential defendants beyond 
mere “perpetrators” under 1591(a)(1)—i.e., traffick-
ers—to participants who provide support for the “[the 
underlying sex trafficking] venture.”  18 U.S.C. 
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1591(a)(2).  There is nothing in the language or context 
of the statute that suggests that Congress intended to 
exclude websites that facilitate the commercial sex 
business from the reach of the TVPRA.  Such an ex-
emption would be akin to an exemption for brick-and-
mortal hotels that openly solicit and support illegal 
commercial sex on their premises, which is directly in-
consistent with the interpretation taken by the United 
States.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice, Louisiana Motel 
Owner Pleads Guilty in Sex Trafficking Case (July 1, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louisiana-motel-o 
wner-pleads-guilty-sex-trafficking-case (prosecution of 
motel owner for financially benefiting from sex traffick-
ing ventures). 
 In this case, the First Circuit’s “but-for” gloss on 
the “treat as a publisher” language of Section 230 plain-
ly undermines legislative efforts to curtail the sexual 
exploitation of children.  The decision therefore trans-
forms the CDA from a shield for neutral ISPs from def-
amation suits and analogous forms of civil liability into 
a dangerous sword wielded by Backpage.com and other 
criminal enterprises to enable their unlawful conduct.  
Indeed, the First Circuit’s interpretation essentially 
rejects the common sense proposition that Section 230 
does not relieve websites of the obligation to “comply 
with laws of general applicability,” including those pro-
hibiting the sale of children for sex.  Roommates.com, 
521 F.3d at 1164 n.15.  This is a stunning proposition 
that bears careful examination and analysis.  This case 
presents an opportunity to correct and reconcile the 
boundaries of Section 230 with the TVPRA and its goal 
of protecting children from sex trafficking. 
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C. The First Circuit’s Reasoning Extends To 
Other Statutory Private Rights Of Action 
The First Circuit’s treatment of the TVPRA and 
the MATA could have ramifications in other contexts 
where Congress or the States have created private 
rights of action that are integral to the enforcement of 
criminal or civil statutes.  This Court has often recog-
nized the value and importance of private civil remedies 
in statutory enforcement schemes. See, e.g., Rotella v. 
Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557-558 (2000) (holding the object 
of the RICO civil enforcement provision “is thus not 
merely to compensate victims but to turn them into 
prosecutors * * * dedicated to eliminating racketeering 
activity”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634-635 (1985) (“Without 
doubt, the private cause of action plays a central role in 
enforcing [the Sherman Act antitrust] regime.”) .  
Congress has frequently included such private 
rights of action to enhance statutory enforcement 
schemes.  For example, the Anti-Terrorism Act con-
tains a civil liability provision, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), that 
allows victims of “act[s] of international terrorism” to 
recover damages for their injuries.  Numerous statutes 
similarly afford private rights of actions that are inte-
gral to enforcement goals.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) 
(authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act); 18 U.S.C. 2252A (authorizing private plaintiffs to 
sue for violations of the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996); 18 U.S.C. 1030(g) (authorizing private 
plaintiffs to sue for violations of the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act); 18 U.S.C. 1836(b)(1) (authorizing pri-
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vate plaintiffs to sue for violations of the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2016).6  
 Nothing in the language of the CDA, the TVPRA, 
or these other specialized enforcement statutes sug-
gests that an ISP that participates in terrorism, racket-
eering, or sex trafficking ought to be shielded against 
statutory civil liability for their own aid to and partici-
pation in that illegal conduct.  Yet the First Circuit’s 
reasoning in this sex trafficking case, applied to these 
other statutes, likely will foreclose a civil action against 
a website operator for its affirmative conduct so long as 
third-party content appearing on the internet forms 
some part of the chain of events that leads to liability.  
This case provides this Court with an opportunity to 
resolve whether, as petitioners contend, this is a result 
that Congress “did not intend.”  POM Wonderful v. Co-
ca Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2239 (2014). 
                                                 
6 In addition, the civil code contains numerous statutory pro-
visions creating private rights of action. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) 
(authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1) (authorizing private 
plaintiffs to sue for violations of the Lanham Act); 15 U.S.C. 
1691e(a) (authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act); 15 U.S.C. 1640(a) (authorizing pri-
vate plaintiffs to sue for violations of the Truth in Lending Act); 15 
U.S.C. 15(a) (authorizing private plaintiffs to sue for violations of 
the Clayton Antitrust Act).  
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of 
certiorari should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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and Andrea Powell, Executive Director, on brief for 
FAIR Girls, amicus curiae. 
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SELYA, Circuit Judge.  This is a hard case — 
hard not in the sense that the legal issues defy resolu-
tion, but hard in the sense that the law requires that 
we, like the court below, deny relief to plaintiffs whose 
circumstances evoke outrage.  The result we must 
reach is rooted in positive law.  Congress addressed the 
right to publish the speech of others in the Information 
Age when it enacted the Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 (CDA).  See 47 U.S.C. § 230.  Congress later ad-
dressed the need to guard against the evils of sex traf-
ficking when it enacted the Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), codified as 
relevant here at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595.  These lauda-
ble legislative efforts do not fit together seamlessly, 
and this case reflects the tension between them.  Strik-
ing the balance in a way that we believe is consistent 
with both congressional intent and the teachings of 
precedent, we affirm the district court’s order of dis-
missal.  The tale follows. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to dis-
miss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we 
draw upon the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the 
operative pleading (here, the second amended com-
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plaint).  See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 438 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
Backpage.com provides online classified advertis-
ing, allowing users to post advertisements in a range of 
categories based on the product or service being sold.1 
Among the categories provided is one for “Adult En-
tertainment,” which includes a subcategory labeled 
“Escorts.”  The site is differentiated by geographic ar-
ea, enabling users to target their advertisements and 
permitting potential customers to see local postings. 
This suit involves advertisements posted in the 
“Escorts” section for three young women — all minors 
at the relevant times — who claim to have been victims 
of sex trafficking.  Suing pseudonymously, the women 
allege that Backpage, with an eye to maximizing its 
profits, engaged in a course of conduct designed to facil-
itate sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise their victims 
on the website.  This strategy, the appellants say, led to 
their victimization. 
Past is prologue.  In 2010, a competing website 
(Craigslist) shuttered its adult advertising section due 
to concerns about sex trafficking.  Spying an opportuni-
ty, Backpage expanded its marketing footprint in the 
adult advertising arena.  According to the appellants, 
the expansion had two aspects.  First, Backpage en-
gaged in a campaign to distract attention from its role 
in sex trafficking by, for example, meeting on various 
occasions with hierarchs of the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and making 
                     
1 The appellants sued Backpage.com, LLC, Camarillo Holdings, 
LLC, and New Times Media, LLC. For ease in exposition, we re-
fer to these three affiliated companies, collectively, as “Backpage.” 
5a 
 
 
“false and misleading representations” to the NCMEC 
and law enforcement regarding its efforts to combat 
sex trafficking.  But this campaign, the appellants sug-
gest, was merely a ruse. 
The second aspect of Backpage’s expansion strate-
gy involved the deliberate structuring of its website to 
facilitate sex trafficking.  The appellants aver that 
Backpage selectively removed certain postings made in 
the “Escorts” section (such as postings made by victim 
support organizations and law enforcement “sting” ad-
vertisements) and tailored its posting requirements to 
make sex trafficking easier.2 
In addition, the appellants allege that Backpage’s 
rules and processes governing the content of adver-
tisements are designed to encourage sex trafficking.  
For example, Backpage does not require phone number 
verification and permits the posting of phone numbers 
in alternative formats.  There is likewise no e-mail veri-
fication, and Backpage provides users with the option 
to “hide” their e-mail addresses in postings, because 
Backpage provides message forwarding services and 
auto-replies on behalf of the advertiser.  Photographs 
uploaded for use in advertisements are shorn of their 
metadata, thus removing from scrutiny information 
                     
2 The appellants note that (among other things) the process of 
posting an advertisement in the “Escorts” section does not require 
the poster to provide either identifying information or the subject 
of the advertisement. And even though the website does require 
that posters verify that they are 18 years of age or older to post in 
that section, entering an age below 18 on the first (or any succes-
sive) attempt does not block a poster from entering a different age 
on a subsequent attempt. Backpage also allows users to pay post-
ing fees anonymously through prepaid credit cards or digital cur-
rencies. 
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such as the date, time, and location the photograph was 
taken.  While Backpage’s automated filtering system 
screens out advertisements containing certain prohibit-
ed terms, such as “barely legal” and “high school,” a 
failed attempt to enter one of these terms does not pre-
vent the poster from substituting workarounds, such as 
“brly legal” or “high schl.” 
The appellants suggest that Backpage profits from 
having its thumb on the scale in two ways.  First, ad-
vertisements in the “Adult Entertainment” section are 
the only ones for which Backpage charges a posting fee.  
Second, users may pay an additional fee for “Sponsored 
Ads,” which appear on the right-hand side of every 
page of the “Escorts” section.  A “Sponsored Ad” in-
cludes a smaller version of the image from the posted 
advertisement and information about the location and 
availability of the advertised individual. 
Beginning at age 15, each of the appellants was 
trafficked through advertisements posted on Backpage.  
Jane Doe #1 was advertised on Backpage during two 
periods in 2012 and 2013.  She estimates that, as a re-
sult, she was raped over 1,000 times.  Jane Doe #2 was 
advertised on Backpage between 2010 and 2012.  She 
estimates that, as a result, she was raped over 900 
times.  Jane Doe #3 was advertised on Backpage from 
December of 2013 until some unspecified future date.  
As a result, she was raped on numerous occasions.3 All 
of the rapes occurred either in Massachusetts or Rhode 
                     
3 Once the parents of Doe #3 located some of the Backpage adver-
tisements featuring their daughter, they demanded that the ad-
vertisements be removed from the website. A week later (after at 
least one other entreaty to Backpage), the postings remained on 
the website. 
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Island.  Sometimes the sex traffickers posted the ad-
vertisements directly and sometimes they forced the 
victims to post the advertisements. 
Typically, each posted advertisement included im-
ages of the particular appellant, usually taken by the 
traffickers (but advertisements for Doe #3 included 
some pictures that she herself had taken).  Many of the 
advertisements embodied challenged practices such as 
anonymous payment for postings, coded terminology 
meant to refer to underage girls, and altered telephone 
numbers. 
The appellants filed suit against Backpage in Octo-
ber of 2014.  The operative pleading is the appellants’ 
second amended complaint, which limns three sets of 
claims.  The first set consists of claims that Backpage 
engaged in sex trafficking of minors as defined by the 
TVPRA and its Massachusetts counterpart, the Massa-
chusetts Anti-Human Trafficking and Victim Protec-
tion Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 
50(a).  The second set consists of claims under a Massa-
chusetts consumer protection statute, which forbids 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of 
any trade or commerce.”  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 
§ 2(a).  The last set consists of claims alleging abridge-
ments of intellectual property rights. 
In due season, Backpage moved to dismiss the se-
cond amended complaint for failure to state claims upon 
which relief could be granted.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  Although the appellants vigorously opposed 
the motion, the district court dismissed the action in its 
entirety.  See Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 
104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 165 (D. Mass. 2015).  This timely 
appeal ensued. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
The appellants, ably represented, have constructed 
a series of arguments.  Those arguments are buttressed 
by a legion of amici (whose helpful briefs we appreci-
ate).  We review the district court’s dismissal of the ap-
pellants’ complaint for failure to state any actionable 
claim de novo, taking as true the well-pleaded facts and 
drawing all reasonable inferences in the appellants’ fa-
vor.  See Tambone, 597 F.3d at 441.  In undertaking 
this canvass, we are not bound by the district court’s 
ratiocination but may affirm the dismissal on any 
ground apparent from the record.  See Santiago v. 
Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011).  It is 
through this prism that we evaluate the appellants’ as-
severational array. 
A.  Trafficking Claims. 
The appellants challenge the district court’s conclu-
sion that section 230 of the CDA shields Backpage from 
liability for a course of conduct that allegedly amounts 
to participation in sex trafficking.  We begin our con-
sideration of this challenge with the text of section 
230(c), which provides: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” block-
ing and screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or 
speaker 
No provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by an-
other information content provider. 
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(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of — 
(A) any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith to re-
strict access to or availabil-
ity of material that the pro-
vider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise ob-
jectionable, whether or not 
such material is constitu-
tionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to ena-
ble or make available to in-
formation content providers 
or others the technical 
means to restrict access to 
material described in [sub-
paragraph (A)]. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  Congress enacted this statute par-
tially in response to court cases that held internet pub-
lishers liable for defamatory statements posted by third 
parties on message boards maintained by the publish-
ers.  See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. 
Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995) (explaining that Prodigy was liable because, un-
like some other website operators, it had taken steps to 
screen or edit content posted on its message board).  
Section 230(c) limits this sort of liability in two ways.  
Principally, it shields website operators from being 
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“treated as the publisher or speaker” of material posted 
by users of the site, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which means 
that “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable 
for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions — such as deciding whether to publish, with-
draw, postpone or alter content — are barred,” Zeran 
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).  
Relatedly, it allows website operators to engage in 
blocking and screening of third-party content, free from 
liability for such good-faith efforts.  See 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(2)(A). 
There has been near-universal agreement that sec-
tion 230 should not be construed grudgingly.  See, e.g., 
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 
413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
456 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2006); Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 
2003).  This preference for broad construction recogniz-
es that websites that display third-party content may 
have an infinite number of users generating an enor-
mous amount of potentially harmful content, and hold-
ing website operators liable for that content “would 
have an obvious chilling effect” in light of the difficulty 
of screening posts for potential issues.  Zeran, 129 F.3d 
at 331.  The obverse of this proposition is equally sali-
ent: Congress sought to encourage websites to make 
efforts to screen content without fear of liability.  See 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)-(4); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; see al-
so Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418-19.  Such a hands-off approach 
is fully consistent with Congress’s avowed desire to 
permit the continued development of the internet with 
minimal regulatory interference.  See 47 U.S.C. § 
230(a)(4), (b)(2). 
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In holding Backpage harmless here, the district 
court found section 230(c)(1) controlling.  See Back-
page.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 154-56. Section 230(c)(1) 
can be broken down into three component parts.  It 
shields conduct if the defendant (1) ”is a ‘provider or 
user of an interactive computer service’; (2) the claim is 
based on ‘information provided by another information 
content provider’; and (3) the claim would treat [the de-
fendant] ‘as the publisher or speaker’ of that infor-
mation.”  Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(1)).  The appellants do not allege that Backpage 
fails to satisfy either of the first two elements.4  In-
stead, they confine themselves to the argument that 
their asserted causes of action do not treat Backpage as 
the publisher or speaker of the contents of the adver-
tisements through which they were trafficked.  It is to 
this argument that we now turn. 
The broad construction accorded to section 230 as a 
whole has resulted in a capacious conception of what it 
means to treat a website operator as the publisher or 
speaker of information provided by a third party.  
Courts have recognized that “many causes of action 
might be premised on the publication or speaking of 
what one might call ‘information content.’” Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).  The 
ultimate question, though, does not depend on the form 
of the asserted cause of action; rather, it depends on 
                     
4 Certain amici advance an argument forsworn by the appellants in 
the district court: that Backpage’s activities amount to creating 
the content of the advertisements. It is, however, clear beyond 
hope of contradiction that amici cannot “interject into a case issues 
which the litigants, whatever their reasons might be, have chosen 
to ignore.”  Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 175 (1st 
Cir. 1989). 
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whether the cause of action necessarily requires that 
the defendant be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
content provided by another.  See id. at 1101-02.  Thus, 
courts have invoked the prophylaxis of section 230(c)(1) 
in connection with a wide variety of causes of action, 
including housing discrimination, see Chi. Lawyers’ 
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008), negligence, see 
Doe, 528 F.3d at 418, Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 
F.3d 465, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2003); and securities fraud and 
cyberstalking, see Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421-22. 
The appellants have an uphill climb: the TVPRA 
claims that they appear to treat Backpage as the pub-
lisher or speaker of the content of the challenged ad-
vertisements.  After all, the appellants acknowledge in 
their complaint that the contents of all of the relevant 
advertisements were provided either by their traffick-
ers or by the appellants themselves (under orders from 
their traffickers).  Since the appellants were trafficked 
by means of these advertisements, there would be no 
harm to them but for the content of the postings. 
The appellants nonetheless insist that their allega-
tions do not treat Backpage as a publisher or speaker of 
third-party content.  They rest this hypothesis largely 
on the text of the TVPRA’s civil remedy provision, 
which provides that victims may bring a civil suit 
against a perpetrator “or whoever knowingly benefits, 
financially or by receiving anything of value from par-
ticipation in a venture which that person knew or 
should have known has engaged in an act” of sex traf-
ficking.  18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); see id. § 1591.  Characteriz-
ing their allegations as describing “an affirmative 
course of conduct” by Backpage distinct from the exer-
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cise of the “traditional publishing or editorial functions” 
protected under the CDA, the appellants contend that 
this course of conduct amounts to participation in sex 
trafficking and, thus, can ground liability without treat-
ing Backpage as the publisher or speaker of any of the 
underlying content.  This contention comprises more 
cry than wool. 
We begin with the appellants’ assertion that Back-
page’s activities do not involve traditional publishing or 
editorial functions, and are therefore outside the pro-
tective carapace of section 230(c)(1).  In support, the 
complaint describes choices that Backpage has made 
about the posting standards for advertisements — for 
example, rules about which terms are permitted or not 
permitted in a posting, the lack of controls on the dis-
play of phone numbers, the option to anonymize e-mail 
addresses, the stripping of metadata from photographs 
uploaded to the website, the website’s reaction after a 
forbidden term is entered into an advertisement, and 
Backpage’s acceptance of anonymous payments.  The 
appellants submit that these choices are distinguishable 
from publisher functions.  We disagree. 
As an initial matter, some of the challenged prac-
tices — most obviously, the choice of what words or 
phrases can be displayed on the site — are traditional 
publisher functions under any coherent definition of the 
term.  See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (describing decisions 
about “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content” as “traditional editorial functions”).  And after 
careful consideration, we are convinced that the “pub-
lisher or speaker” language of section 230(c)(1) extends 
to the formulation of precisely the sort of website poli-
cies and practices that the appellants assail. 
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Precedent cinches the matter.  In Lycos, we con-
sidered the argument that the prophylaxis of section 
230 (c) did not encompass “decisions regarding the ‘con-
struct and operation’” of a defendant’s websites.  478 
F.3d at 422.  There, the plaintiffs alleged that Lycos 
permitted users to register under multiple screen 
names and provided links to “objective financial infor-
mation” from a finance-related message board, thus en-
abling “individuals to spread misinformation more cred-
ibly.”  Id. at 420.  We noted that, at bottom, the plain-
tiffs were “ultimately alleging that the construct and 
operation of Lycos’s web sites contributed to the prolif-
eration of misinformation” and held that as long as “the 
cause of action is one that would treat the service pro-
vider as the publisher of a particular posting, immunity 
applies not only for the service provider’s decisions 
with respect to that posting, but also for its inherent 
decisions about how to treat postings generally.”  Id. at 
422.  In short, “Lycos’s decision not to reduce misin-
formation by changing its web site policies was as much 
an editorial decision with respect to that misinfor-
mation as a decision not to delete a particular posting.”  
Id. 
The case at hand fits comfortably within this con-
struct.  Without exception, the appellants’ well-pleaded 
claims address the structure and operation of the 
Backpage website, that is, Backpage’s decisions about 
how to treat postings.  Those claims challenge features 
that are part and parcel of the overall design and oper-
ation of the website (such as the lack of phone number 
verification, the rules about whether a person may post 
after attempting to enter a forbidden term, and the 
procedure for uploading photographs).  Features such 
as these, which reflect choices about what content can 
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appear on the website and in what form, are editorial 
choices that fall within the purview of traditional pub-
lisher functions.5 
At oral argument in this court, the appellants 
placed particular emphasis on Backpage’s provision of 
e-mail anonymization, forwarding, auto-reply, and stor-
age services to posters.  In the last analysis, however, 
the decision to provide such services and the parallel 
decision not to impose the same conditions on messag-
ing services as are applied to “Escorts” section postings 
are no less publisher choices, entitled to the protections 
of section 230(c)(1). 
We add, moreover, that applying section 230(c)(1) 
to shield Backpage from liability here is congruent with 
the case law elsewhere.  Relying on that provision, 
courts have rejected claims that attempt to hold web-
site operators liable for failing to provide sufficient pro-
tections to users from harmful content created by oth-
ers.  For instance, where a minor claimed to have been 
sexually assaulted by someone she met through the de-
fendant’s website and her suit alleged that the website 
operator “fail[ed] to implement basic safety measures 
to protect minors,” the Fifth Circuit rejected the suit 
on the basis that the claims were “merely another way 
of claiming that [the website operator] was liable for 
publishing the communications and they speak to [the 
website operator’s] role as a publisher of online third-
party-generated content.”  Doe, 528 F.3d at 419-20.  
                     
5 The appellants argue that a concurring opinion in J.S. v. Village 
Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 718-24 (Wash. 2015) 
(en banc) (Wiggins, J., concurring), points to a different conclusion. 
But our reasoning in Lycos — which the J.S. concurrence failed to 
address — defeats this argument. 
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Although the appellants try to distinguish Doe by 
claiming Backpage’s decisions about what measures to 
implement deliberately attempt to make sex trafficking 
easier, this is a distinction without a difference.  What-
ever Backpage’s motivations, those motivations do not 
alter the fact that the complaint premises liability on 
the decisions that Backpage is making as a publisher 
with respect to third-party content. 
Nor does the text of the TVPRA’s civil remedy 
provision change this result.  Though a website con-
ceivably might display a degree of involvement suffi-
cient to render its operator both a publisher and a par-
ticipant in a sex trafficking venture (say, that the web-
site operator helped to procure the underaged youths 
who were being trafficked), the facts pleaded in the se-
cond amended complaint do not appear to achieve this 
duality.  But even if we assume, for argument’s sake, 
that Backpage’s conduct amounts to “participation in a 
[sex trafficking] venture” — a phrase that no published 
opinion has yet interpreted — the TVPRA claims as 
pleaded premise that participation on Backpage’s ac-
tions as a publisher or speaker of third-party content.  
The strictures of section 230(c) foreclose such suits.6 
Contrary to the appellants’ importunings, the deci-
sion in Barnes does not demand a different outcome.  
There, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a promissory 
estoppel claim based on a Yahoo executive’s statements 
that the company would remove explicit photographs 
                     
6 To be sure, the complaint contains a few allegations that do not 
involve the publication of third-party content. Yet those allega-
tions, treated in detail in Part II(B) infra, rely on sententious 
rhetoric rather than well-pleaded facts. Thus, they cannot suffice 
to alter our conclusion here. 
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that had been posted online without the consent of the 
person depicted was not barred by section 230(c)(1).  
See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098-99, 1109.  Withal, this 
promissory estoppel claim did not attempt to treat Ya-
hoo as the publisher or speaker of the photograph’s 
content but, instead, the claim sought to hold Yahoo li-
able for its “manifest intention to be legally obligated to 
do something” (that is, to delete the photographs).  Id. 
at 1107.  No comparable promise has been alleged here. 
That ends this aspect of the matter.  We hold that 
claims that a website facilitates illegal conduct through 
its posting rules necessarily treat the website as a pub-
lisher or speaker of content provided by third parties 
and, thus, are precluded by section 230(c)(1).  This hold-
ing is consistent with, and reaffirms, the principle that 
a website operator’s decisions in structuring its website 
and posting requirements are publisher functions enti-
tled to section 230(c)(1) protection. 
In this case, third-party content is like Banquo’s 
ghost: it appears as an essential component of each and 
all of the appellants’ TVPRA claims.  Because the ap-
pellants’ claims under the TVPRA necessarily treat 
Backpage as the publisher or speaker of content sup-
plied by third parties, the district court did not err in 
dismissing those claims.7 
In an effort to shift the trajectory of the debate, 
the appellants try a pair of end runs.  First, the appel-
                     
7 Although the parties do not separately parse the text of the MA-
TA, those claims fail for essentially the same reasons: they treat 
Backpage as the publisher or speaker of content provided by third 
parties. As a result, the MATA — at least in this application — is 
necessarily inconsistent with the protections provided by section 
230(c)(1) and, therefore, preempted. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). 
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lants call our attention to section 230(c)(2), which pro-
vides that decisions made by website operators to block 
or remove content are protected from liability as long 
as they are made in good faith.  Building on this founda-
tion, the appellants assert that the district court relied 
on Backpage’s descriptions of its efforts to block and 
screen the postings in the “Escorts” section of its web-
site, and that those descriptions amount to an implicit 
invocation of section 230(c)(2).  So, the appellants say, 
the district court should have allowed discovery into 
Backpage’s good faith (or lack of it) in blocking and 
screening content.  The district court’s refusal to allow 
them to pursue this course, they charge, eviscerates 
section 230(c)(2) and renders it superfluous. 
The appellants start from a faulty premise: we do 
not read the district court’s opinion as relying on Back-
page’s assertions about its behavior.  That Backpage 
sought to respond to allegations of misconduct by 
(among other things) touting its efforts to combat sex 
trafficking does not, without more, invoke section 
230(c)(2) as a defense. 
The appellants’ suggestion of superfluity is like-
wise misplaced.  Courts routinely have recognized that 
section 230(c)(2) provides a set of independent protec-
tions for websites, see, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105; 
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 670-71; Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 n.14 (9th Cir., and nothing 
about the district court’s analysis is at odds with that 
conclusion. 
Next, the appellants suggest that their TVPRA 
claims are saved by the operation of section 230(e)(1).  
That provision declares that section 230 should not “be 
construed to impair the enforcement of . . . any . . . Fed-
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eral criminal statute.”  The appellants posit that the 
TVPRA’s civil suit provision is part of the “enforce-
ment” of a federal criminal statute under the plain 
meaning of that term and, thus, outside the protections 
afforded by section 230(c)(1).  This argument, though 
creative, does not withstand scrutiny. 
We start with the uncontroversial premise that, 
where feasible, “a statute should be construed in a way 
that conforms to the plain meaning of its text.”  In re 
Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416, 419 (1st Cir. 1995).  The plain-
language reading of section 230(e)(1)’s reference to “the 
enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute” 
dictates a meaning opposite to that ascribed by the ap-
pellants: such a reading excludes civil suits.  See Back-
page.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (pointing out that “the 
common definition of the term ‘criminal,’ as well as its 
use in the context of Section 230(e)(1), specifically ex-
cludes and is distinguished from civil claims” (quoting 
Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 
3813758, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006))).  Other tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction reinforce this con-
clusion.  Although titles or captions may not be used to 
contradict a statute’s text, they can be useful to resolve 
textual ambiguities.  See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. 
& Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947); Berniger 
v. Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp., 945 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 
1991).  Here, the subsection’s title, “[n]o effect on crim-
inal law,” quite clearly indicates that the provision is 
limited to criminal prosecutions. 
It is equally telling that where Congress wanted to 
include both civil and criminal remedies in CDA provi-
sions, it did so through broader language.  For instance, 
section 230(e)(4) states that the protections of section 
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230 should not “be construed to limit the application of 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,” a 
statute that contains both criminal penalties and civil 
remedies.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520.  Preserving the 
“application” of this Act contrasts with Congress’s sig-
nificantly narrower word choice in safeguarding the 
“enforcement” of federal criminal statutes.  The normal 
presumption is that the employment of different words 
within the same statutory scheme is deliberate, so the 
terms ordinarily should be given differing meanings.  
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 
(2004). 
This holding is entirely in keeping with the policies 
animating section 230(e)(1).  Congress made pellucid 
that it sought “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Fed-
eral criminal laws to deter and punish” illicit activities 
online, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5); and this policy coexists 
comfortably with Congress’s choice “not to deter harm-
ful online speech through the . . . route of imposing tort 
liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for 
other parties’ potentially injurious messages,” Lycos, 
478 F.3d at 418 (omission in original) (quoting Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 330-31).  Seen in this light, the distinctions 
between civil and criminal actions — including the dis-
parities in the standard of proof and the availability of 
prosecutorial discretion — reflect a legislative judg-
ment that it is best to avoid the potential chilling ef-
fects that private civil actions might have on internet 
free speech. 
To say more about these attempted end runs would 
be pointless.  They are futile, and do not cast the slight-
est doubt on our conclusion that the district court ap-
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propriately dismissed the appellants’ sex trafficking 
claims as barred by section 230(c)(1). 
B.  Chapter 93A Claims. 
We turn next to the appellants’ state-law unfair 
trade practices claims.  A Massachusetts statute, famil-
iarly known as Chapter 93A, creates a private right of 
action in favor of any individual “who has been injured 
by another person’s use or employment” of unfair or 
deceptive business practices.  See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
93A, § 9(1).  The appellants’ Chapter 93A claims (as 
framed on appeal) target misrepresentations allegedly 
made by Backpage to law enforcement and the 
NCMEC regarding Backpage’s efforts at self-
regulation.  The district court jettisoned these claims, 
concluding that the causal chain alleged by the appel-
lants was “too speculative to fall as a matter of law 
within the penumbra of reasonabl[e] foreseeability.”  
Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 162. 
As this ruling hinges on the plausibility of the ap-
pellants’ allegations of causation, we first rehearse the 
plausibility standard.  It is, of course, apodictic that a 
plaintiff must supply “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  Although this requirement does not 
call for the pleading of exquisite factual detail, the com-
plaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to re-
lief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
Evaluating the plausibility of a complaint is a two-
step process.  First, “the court must separate the com-
plaint’s factual allegations (which must be accepted as 
true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need 
not be credited).”  Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 
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F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012). Second, the court must de-
termine whether the remaining facts allow it “to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.”  Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  In carrying out this evalua-
tion, the court must view the claim as a whole, instead 
of demanding “a one-to-one relationship between any 
single allegation and a necessary element of the cause 
of action.”  Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 
F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013). 
With this standard in mind, we proceed to the ap-
pellants’ assignment of error.  To prevail on a Chapter 
93A claim of this sort, the “plaintiff must prove causa-
tion — that is, the plaintiff is required to prove that the 
defendant’s unfair or deceptive act caused an adverse 
consequence or loss.”  Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, 
Inc., 961 N.E.2d 1067, 1076 (Mass. 2012).  This require-
ment entails showing both “a causal connection be-
tween the deception and the loss and that the loss was 
foreseeable as a result of the deception.”  Smith v. Jen-
kins, 732 F.3d 51, 71 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Casavant 
v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 952 N.E.2d 908, 912 
(Mass. 2011)).  In other words, the plaintiff must lay the 
groundwork for findings of both actual and proximate 
causation.  If an examination of the claim leads to the 
conclusion that it fails plausibly to allege a causal chain 
sufficient to ground an entitlement to relief, that claim 
is susceptible to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).  See 
A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 82 & 
n.2 (1st Cir. 2013). 
Here, the second amended complaint attempts to 
forge the causal chain as follows: Backpage made a se-
ries of disingenuous representations to law enforce-
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ment officers and the NCMEC regarding its supposed 
commitment to combating sex trafficking, including 
representations about technical changes to its website 
and its efforts to screen and monitor postings; Back-
page neither kept these commitments nor made the 
technical changes that had been discussed; instead, 
Backpage engaged in a series of pretextual actions to 
generate the appearance of combating sex trafficking 
(though it knew that these actions would not actually 
eliminate sex trafficking from the website); this amal-
gam of misrepresentations and deceptive practices 
“minimized and delayed” any real scrutiny of what 
Backpage was actually doing, thus allowing Backpage 
to gain a dominant market share in the online advertis-
ing of sex trafficking; and this sequence of events 
harmed the appellants by increasing their risk of being 
trafficked. 
This causal chain is shot through with conjecture: it 
pyramids speculative inference upon speculative infer-
ence.  This rampant guesswork extends to the effect of 
the alleged misrepresentations on an indeterminate 
number of third parties, the real impact of Backpage’s 
behavior on the overall marketplace for sex trafficking, 
and the odds that the appellants would not have been 
victimized had Backpage been more forthright. 
When all is said and done, it is apparent that the at-
tenuated causal chain proposed by the appellants is 
forged entirely out of surmise.  Put another way, the 
causation element is backed only by “the type of con-
clusory statement[s] that need not be credited at the 
Rule 12(b)(6) stage.”  Maddox, 732 F.3d at 80.  Charges 
hinting at Machiavellian manipulation (such as the 
charge that Backpage’s “communications with NCMEC 
24a 
 
 
were simply an effort to create a diversion as Back-
page.com solidified its market position” or the charge 
that Backpage’s posting review program “appears to be 
merely superficial”) cannot serve as surrogates for 
well-pleaded facts. 
To be sure, the complaint does plead a few hard 
facts.  For example, it indicates that some meetings oc-
curred involving Backpage and the NCMEC.  It also 
indicates that Backpage made some efforts (albeit not 
the ones that the NCMEC recommended) to address 
sex trafficking.  But beyond these scanty assertions, 
the complaint does not offer factual support for its at-
tenuated causal analysis. 
In an effort to plug this gaping hole, the appellants 
argue that in a Chapter 93A case the plausibility of 
causation should be tested at the pleading stage not by 
looking at facts but, rather, by employing “common 
economic sense.”  Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769, 2015 WL 314131, at *4 (D. 
Mass. Jan. 26, 2015); accord Katin v. Nat’l Real Estate 
Info. Servs., Inc., No. 07-10882, 2009 WL 929554, at *7, 
*10 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2009).  Yet, facts are the linchpin 
of plausibility; and the cases that the appellants cite are 
inapposite.  Those cases involve competitors suing each 
other pursuant to section 11 of Chapter 93A.  This dis-
tinction is significant because although causation in sec-
tion 11 cases between competitors turns on the deci-
sions of third parties (customers), the causal chain be-
tween the unfair act and the harm to the plaintiff is 
much shorter and more direct than the chain that the 
appellants so laboriously attempt to construct. 
The short of it is that the pertinent allegations in 
the second amended complaint are insufficient “to re-
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move the possibility of relief from the realm of mere 
conjecture.”  Tambone, 597 F.3d at 442.  It follows in-
exorably that the district court did not err in dismissing 
the appellants’ Chapter 93A claims.8 
C.  Intellectual Property Claims. 
This brings us to the appellants’ intellectual prop-
erty claims.  Section 230 provides that “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.”  47 U.S.C. § 
230(e)(2).  We assume, without deciding, that the appel-
lants’ remaining claims come within the compass of this 
exception.9 
1. Unauthorized Use of Pictures of a Person.  All 
of the appellants brought claims under state laws (Mas-
sachusetts and/or Rhode Island) guarding against the 
unauthorized use of a person’s picture.  See Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 214, § 3A; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.  These 
nearly identical statutes, reprinted in relevant part in 
                     
8 For the sake of completeness, we note that the court below held, 
in the alternative, that the appellants’ Chapter 93A claims were 
barred by section 230(c)(1). See Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 
162-63. We express no opinion on this alternative holding. 
9 The application of the exemption to the appellants’ state law 
claims for the unauthorized use of pictures is not free from doubt. 
At least one court of appeals has suggested that state law intellec-
tual property claims are not covered by this exemption. See Per-
fect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19, 1119 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 2007); but cf. Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422-23, 423 n.7 (applying sec-
tion 230(e)(2) to a claim under state trademark law, albeit without 
detailed analysis). To make a muddled matter even murkier, 
Backpage argues that the unauthorized use of pictures claims do 
not involve intellectual property but, rather, stem from privacy 
rights protected by tort law. We need not reach either of these 
issues. 
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the margin,10 confer private rights of action upon indi-
viduals whose images are used for commercial purposes 
without their consent.  The appellants insist that Back-
page, by garnering advertising revenues from their 
traffickers, profited from the unauthorized use of their 
photographs.  This fusillade is wide of the mark: the 
statutes in question impose liability only upon persons 
or entities who deliberately use another’s image for 
commercial gain.  As we explain below, Backpage (on 
the facts alleged here) is not such an entity. 
Neither the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
(SJC) nor the Rhode Island Supreme Court has con-
fronted the exact scenario that is presented here.  Our 
                     
10 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A provides in relevant part that: 
Any person whose name, portrait or picture 
is used within the commonwealth for advertising 
purposes or for the purposes of trade without his 
written consent may bring a civil action . . . 
against the person so using his name, portrait or 
picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; 
and may recover damages for any injuries sus-
tained by reason of such use. 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28(a) provides, as pertinent here, that: 
Any person whose name, portrait, or picture 
is used within the state for commercial purposes 
without his or her written consent may bring an 
action . . . against the person so using his or her 
name, portrait, or picture to prevent and restrain 
the use thereof, and may recover damages for any 
injuries sustained by reason of such use. 
To the modest extent that the wording of these statutes dif-
fers, neither the appellants nor Backpage suggests that the differ-
ences affect our analysis in any way. We therefore treat the stat-
utes interchangeably. 
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task, then, is to make an informed determination of how 
each court would rule if it faced the question, taking in-
to account analogous state decisions, cases from other 
jurisdictions, learned treatises, and relevant policy ra-
tionales.  See Andrew Robinson Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2008).  Here, 
the tea leaves are easy to read. 
The SJC has articulated the key point in the follow-
ing way: “the crucial distinction . . . must be between 
situations in which the defendant makes an incidental 
use of the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture and those 
in which the defendant uses the plaintiff’s name, por-
trait or picture deliberately to exploit its value for ad-
vertising or trade purposes.”  Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly 
Co., 400 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1980).  Exploitation for 
advertising or trade purposes requires that the use of 
the image be “for the purpose of appropriating to the 
defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values as-
sociated with the name or likeness.”  Id. (quoting Nel-
son v. Me. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1977)).  So, 
too, the nearly identical Rhode Island statute requires 
a showing that by using the image “the defendant 
commercially exploited [the plaintiff] without his per-
mission.”  Leddy v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 843 
A.2d 481, 490 (R.I. 2004); accord Mendonsa v. Time Inc., 
678 F. Supp. 967, 971 (D.R.I. 1988). 
The appellants argue that the use of their images 
cannot be written off as incidental because their pic-
tures were “the centerpieces of commercial advertise-
ments.”  But this argument misapprehends both the 
case law and the rationale that animates the underlying 
right.  Tropeano exemplifies the point.  That case in-
volved the publication of the plaintiff’s image to illus-
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trate a magazine article in which she was not even 
mentioned.  See 400 N.E.2d at 848.  The SJC concluded 
that this was an incidental use of the image, notwith-
standing that the article and accompanying picture 
could be said to benefit the publisher.  See id. at 851.  
The fact that the publisher was a for-profit business did 
“not by itself transform the incidental publication of the 
plaintiff’s picture into an appropriation for advertising 
or trade purposes.”  Id. 
In our view, Tropeano establishes that even a use 
leading to some profit for the publisher is not a use for 
advertising or trade purposes unless the use is de-
signed to “appropriat[e] to the defendant’s benefit the 
commercial or other values associated with the name or 
likeness.”  Id. at 850 (quoting Nelson, 373 A.2d at 1224).  
That is the rule in Massachusetts, and we are confident 
that essentially the same rule prevails in Rhode Island. 
Here, there is no basis for an inference that Back-
page appropriated the commercial value of the appel-
lants’ images.  Although Backpage does profit from the 
sale of advertisements, it is not the entity that benefits 
from the misappropriation.  A publisher like Backpage 
is “merely the conduit through which the advertising 
and publicity matter of customers” is conveyed, 
Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1966), and the party who actually benefits from the 
misappropriation is the advertiser.  Matters might be 
different if Backpage had used the pictures to advertise 
its own services, see id., but the appellants proffer no 
such claim. 
Basic policy considerations reinforce this result.  
There would be obviously deleterious consequences to a 
rule placing advertising media, such as newspapers, 
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television stations, or websites, at risk of liability every 
time they sell an advertisement to a party who engages 
in misappropriation of another person’s likeness.  Given 
this verity, it is hardly surprising that the appellants 
have identified no case in which a publisher of an ad-
vertisement furnished by a third party has been held 
liable for a misappropriation present within it.  The 
proper target of any suit for damages in such a situa-
tion must be the advertiser who increases his own 
business through the misappropriation (in this case, the 
traffickers).11 
We need not tarry.  On this understanding, we up-
hold the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’ 
claims under the aforementioned state statutes. 
2. Copyright.  The last leg of our journey takes us 
to a singular claim of copyright infringement.  Shortly 
after the institution of suit, Doe #3 registered a copy-
right in one of the photographs used by her traffickers.  
In the second amended complaint, she included a claim 
for copyright infringement.  The court below dismissed 
this claim, reasoning that it identified no redressable 
injury.  See Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 165.  Doe 
#3 challenges this ruling. 
Assuming (without deciding) that Backpage could 
be held liable for copyright infringement, the scope of 
Doe #3’s potential recovery is limited by the fact that 
she did not register her copyright until December of 
2014 — after the instant action had been filed.  By then, 
                     
11 This is precisely the situation reflected in the earliest right of 
privacy cases, see, e.g., Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97 (R.I. 
1909), and the state statutes in this case are designed to codify 
liability for that sort of commercial conduct, see Mendonsa, 678 F. 
Supp. at 969-70; Tropeano, 400 N.E.2d at 850-51. 
30a 
 
 
Backpage was no longer displaying the copyrighted im-
age.  Given the timing of these events, Doe #3 cannot 
recover either statutory damages or attorneys’ fees 
under the Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 412; Johnson 
v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2005).  Any recovery 
would be restricted to compensatory damages under 17 
U.S.C. § 504(b), which permits a successful suitor to re-
cover “the actual damages suffered by . . . her as a re-
sult of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer 
that are attributable to the infringement and are not 
taken into account in computing the actual damages.” 
The prospect of such a recovery, however, is purely 
theoretical: nothing in the complaint raises a plausible 
inference that Doe #3 can recover any damages, or that 
discovery would reveal such an entitlement.  See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (stating that factual allega-
tions must at least “raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence” to suffice as plausible).  
A showing of actual damages requires a plaintiff to 
prove “that the infringement was the cause of [her] loss 
of revenue.”  Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Sup-
port Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (1st Cir. 1994).  Such a 
loss is typically measured by assessing the diminution 
in a copyrighted work’s market value (say, by calculat-
ing lost licensing fees).  See Bruce v. Weekly World 
News, Inc., 310 F.3d 25, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2002); Data 
Gen., 36 F.3d at 1170.  No facts set forth in the second 
amended complaint suggest that the market value of 
Doe #3’s image has been affected in any way by the al-
leged infringement, and Doe #3 points to nothing that 
might plausibly support such an inference. 
By the same token, nothing in the complaint plau-
sibly suggests a basis for a finding that Doe #3 would be 
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entitled to profits attributable to the infringement.  The 
closest that the complaint comes is an optimistic asser-
tion that because photographs “enhance the effective-
ness of advertisements,” Backpage necessarily reaps a 
financial benefit from these images (including, presum-
ably, Doe #3’s photograph).  But a generalized assertion 
that a publisher/infringer profits from providing cus-
tomers with the option to display photographs in ad-
vertisements, standing alone, cannot plausibly be said 
to link the display of a particular image to some dis-
crete portion of the publisher/infringer’s profits.  Cf. 
Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 914-16 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding, at summary judgment, that the effect of 
including a photograph in an advertising brochure was 
too speculative to make out a triable issue on advertis-
er’s profits attributable to infringement).  In short, the 
link that Doe #3 attempts to fashion between the copy-
righted photograph and Backpage’s revenues is wholly 
speculative and, thus, does not cross the plausibility 
threshold.  After all, “[f]actual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
In a last ditch effort to bell the cat, Doe #3 contends 
that the district court erred in failing to determine 
whether she was entitled to injunctive relief under 17 
U.S.C. § 502(a), which permits such relief “to prevent 
or restrain infringement of a copyright.”  She says, in 
effect, that Backpage may still possess the copyrighted 
photograph and that, therefore, she remains at risk of 
future infringement.  We reject this contention. 
To begin, the mere fact of past infringement does 
not entitle a plaintiff to permanent injunctive relief: the 
plaintiff must also show “a substantial likelihood of in-
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fringement in the future.”  Harolds Stores, Inc. v. 
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1555 (10th Cir. 
1996); see 5 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Copyright § 14.06[B][1][a] (2015).  Nothing 
in the complaint suggests that there is any substantial 
likelihood of future infringement by Backpage with re-
spect to the copyrighted photograph.  The known facts 
strongly suggest that no such risk exists: the photo-
graph was posted by a third party who no longer has 
any sway over Doe #3, and Backpage is not alleged to 
post material or create advertisements entirely of its 
own accord.  Thus, any fears of future infringement 
would appear to be unfounded. 
Viewing the complaint as a whole, see Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 569 n.14, we conclude that the distinctive 
facts alleged here simply do not suffice to ground a 
finding that Doe #3 is plausibly entitled to any relief on 
her copyright claim.  Consequently, we discern no error 
in the district court’s dismissal of this claim. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As a final matter, we add a coda.  The appellants’ 
core argument is that Backpage has tailored its website 
to make sex trafficking easier.  Aided by the amici, the 
appellants have made a persuasive case for that propo-
sition.  But Congress did not sound an uncertain trum-
pet when it enacted the CDA, and it chose to grant 
broad protections to internet publishers.  Showing that 
a website operates through a meretricious business 
model is not enough to strip away those protections.  If 
the evils that the appellants have identified are deemed 
to outweigh the First Amendment values that drive the 
CDA, the remedy is through legislation, not through 
litigation. 
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We need go no further.  For the reasons elucidated 
above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
All parties shall bear their own costs. 
 
Affirmed.
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APPENDIX B 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
___________ 
Civil Action No. 14-13870-RGS 
JANE DOE NO. 1, a minor child, 
by her parent and next friend MARY ROE; 
JANE DOE NO. 2; and JANE DOE NO. 3, a minor 
child, by her parents and next friends SAM LOE AND 
SARA LOE 
v. 
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC, CAMARILLO HOLDINGS, 
LLC (f/k/a VILLAGE VOICE MEDIA HOLDINGS, 
LLC), and NEW TIMES MEDIA, LLC 
___________ 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 
___________ 
May 15, 2015 
STEARNS, D.J. 
In this litigation, two important public policies col-
lide head on – the suppression of child sex trafficking 
and the promotion of a free and open Internet.  Plain-
tiffs Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 
3 (the Doe plaintiffs) seek redress in the form of money 
damages from defendants Backpage.com, LLC; Cama-
rillo Holdings, LLC (f/k/a Village Voice Media Hold-
ings, LLC); and New Times Media, LLC.  The Doe 
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plaintiffs allege that they were molested and repeated-
ly raped after being advertised as sexual wares on de-
fendants’ website, backpage.com (Backpage).  Defend-
ants contend that most of the Doe plaintiffs’ claims are 
preempted by the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230, and that the remaining intellec-
tual property claims (unauthorized use of a person’s 
image and copyright infringement) fail to state claims 
upon which relief may be granted. 
BACKGROUND12 
Backpage is an online classifieds forum that groups 
goods and services advertised for sale by geographic 
location and subject matter.  At issue in this case is the 
forum’s adult entertainment section and its subcatego-
ry offering the services of “escorts.”  The Doe plaintiffs 
allege that in the scungy world of adult entertainment, 
this section of Backpage is a notorious haven for pro-
moters of the illicit sex trade, and even more troubling, 
the trafficking of children for sex.  The Doe plaintiffs 
contend that Backpage’s business model depends in 
large part on the revenues it earns from its involve-
ment in the trafficking of children.  To this end, Back-
page is alleged to have structured its adult entertain-
ment section to lightly camouflage its illegal content to 
divert the attention of law enforcement.  In support, 
the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) marshals the 
following facts: 
 Backpage charges a fee for posting adver-
tisements in the adult entertainment section 
(and not in most other licit areas of the web-
                     
12 On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the well-
pleaded facts of a complaint. 
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site).  The fee for the “adult” ads ranges from 
$12.00 to $17.00 per posting.  Backpage 
charges an additional fee for each reposting 
of an adult ad, and for featuring the ad (with 
a selection of text and photos) prominently on 
the right side of the website. 
 Backpage does not require posters in the 
adult entertainment section to verify their 
identity.  The website also does not require 
that the poster use a registered credit card 
linked with a name and address, and accepts 
anonymous payments in the form of prepaid 
credit cards, or pseudo-currencies, such as 
Bitcoin. 
 Backpage does not require a poster to verify 
the age of an “escort” whose services are of-
fered on the website.  Although the website 
will not accept an ad when the poster enters 
an age of less than 18, it will permit the post-
er to immediately re-enter an assumed age. 
 Backpage does not require any verification of 
the telephone numbers posted in its adult en-
tertainment section.  It also permits users to 
enter telephone numbers using any combina-
tion of character strokes rather than in the 
more traceable (by law enforcement) nominal 
numbers required in other sections of the 
website (such as “twoO13fourFive678niNe” 
rather than “201-345-6789”).  Backpage does 
not require posters in the adult entertain-
ment section to use their actual email ad-
dresses, but provides an email forwarding 
service that protects a poster’s anonymity. 
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 Backpage strips out metadata associated 
with photographs (such as date, time, geolo-
cation and other identifying information) be-
fore publishing the photographs on its web-
site.  This prevents law enforcement from ef-
fectively searching for repostings of the same 
photograph. 
 While Backpage bars the use of certain 
words and phrases through its “automatic fil-
tering” system, such as “barely legal,” “high 
school,” “innocent,” “sex,” “blow job,” “hand 
job,” “schoolgirl,” “teen”, and “teenage,” it 
readily permits the use of suggestive circum-
locutions like “girl,” “young,” “underage,” 
and “fresh.”  It also does not filter out easily 
recognizable abbreviations of forbidden 
words, such as “brly legal” or “high schl.” 
The Doe plaintiffs further allege that defendants 
have waged a phony war against sex traffickers to di-
vert attention from their illegal activities.  While Back-
page claims that its adult entertainment advertise-
ments are screened by trained moderators, it has re-
fused to install readily available technology that would 
far more accurately detect the trafficking of children.  
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Back-
page’s highly touted claim to make regular referrals to 
the National Center of Missing & Exploited Children 
has led to few instances of identification or rescue.  Alt-
hough Backpage will on request remove an offending 
ad in the geographic location in which it is posted, it 
does nothing to report or remove the identical ad post-
ed in other geographical areas, or other ads involving 
the same child.  The overall effect, the Doe plaintiffs 
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contend, is to create a Potemkin-like “façade of con-
cern” that obscures the shady source of its filthy lucre.  
SAC ¶ 34. 
Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 
3 aver that they have been each personally harmed by 
defendants’ unsavory business practices.  Jane Doe No. 
1 was first trafficked by pimps on Backpage after run-
ning away from home in February of 2012, when she 
was 15 years old.  She was again sold on Backpage in 
March of 2013, after she ran away a second time.  Be-
tween June of 2013 and September 10, 2013, her “ser-
vices” were advertised on Backpage each and every 
day.  As a result of the ads, she engaged in 10 to 12 sex 
transactions daily with adult men in Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island.  Her pimp moved her from town to town 
every two days to avoid detection.  Jane Doe No. 1 ap-
peared on some 300 ads on Backpage and was raped 
over 1,000 times. 
Backpage listed each ad featuring Jane Doe No. 1 
as an offer of “escort” services, a common euphemism 
for prostitution.  The Jane Doe No. 1 ads included 
known signifiers for child prostitution such as “young,” 
“girl,” “fresh,” “tiny,” “roses,” and “party.”  Jane Doe 
No. 1’s pimp provided a prepaid mobile phone and a 
prepaid credit card to conceal Jane Doe No. 1’s identity 
when Jane Doe No. 1 placed ads on Backpage.  When 
Jane Doe No. 1 attempted to enter her true age (which 
was under 18) during the purchase of an ad, Backpage 
would instruct her to enter her age as 18 or older.  Pho-
tographs of Jane Doe No. 1 (with her facial features ob-
scured, but at least on one occasion displaying a unique 
tattoo) accompanied all of her ads. 
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Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked on Backpage by her 
pimp during various periods between 2010 and 2012 at 
different locations in Massachusetts.  She first ap-
peared on Backpage when she was 15 years old, after 
she had absconded from a residential program.  Ads 
featuring Jane Doe No. 2 were posted either by her 
pimp or an older woman who worked with him (his 
“bottom”).  The ads would appear on Backpage on av-
erage six times a day.  Jane Doe No. 2 was given a pre-
paid mobile phone to answer calls from would-be cus-
tomers generated by the Backpage ads.  As a result of 
the ads, she was coerced into 5-15 sex transactions eve-
ry day.  Like the ads of Jane Doe No. 1, those of Jane 
Doe No. 2 featured her photograph.  The ads were 
placed using a prepaid credit card.  Altogether, Jane 
Doe No. 2 was raped over 900 times while in the thrall 
of her pimp. 
Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked on Backpage in De-
cember of 2013 by her pimp and one or more of his as-
sociates.  The Backpage solicitations for the underage 
Jane Doe No. 3 described her as “new,” “sweet,” and 
“playful.”  As with the other Jane Does, the ads were 
paid for with a prepaid credit card.  Jane Doe No. 3 was 
also given a mobile phone to take calls and texts from 
customers.  She was taken to a hotel in Foxborough, 
Massachusetts, where she was raped by men who re-
sponded to the ads.  Photos of Jane Doe No. 3, including 
one that she had taken of herself, appeared with the ads 
on Backpage.13 
                     
13 At some point, Jane Doe No. 3’s parents became aware of the ads 
featuring their daughter on Backpage and demanded that they be 
taken down.  A week later, the illicit ads still appeared on the web-
site. 
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The Doe plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in October 
of 2014.  In their Second Amended Complaint, they al-
lege that defendants’ business practices violate the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (Count I); the Massa-
chusetts Anti-Human Trafficking and Victim Protec-
tion Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50 
(Count II); and constitute unfair and deceptive business 
practices under the Massachusetts Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9 (Count III).  The 
Doe plaintiffs also bring claims for unauthorized use of 
pictures of a person, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 214, § 3A and 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 (Count IV), and copyright in-
fringement (specific to the photograph taken by Jane 
Doe No. 3 of herself) (Count V).  In January of 2015, de-
fendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Com-
plaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The parties 
and several amici curiae14 filed helpful briefs.  The court 
heard oral argument on April 15, 2015. 
DISCUSSION 
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the 
factual allegations of a complaint must “possess enough 
heft” to set forth “a plausible entitlement to relief.”  
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 559 
(2007); see also Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 
                     
14 The City and County of San Francisco, the City of Atlanta, the 
City and County of Denver, the City of Houston, the City of Phila-
delphia, and the City of Portland (Oregon) (collectively the local 
government amici) and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sub-
mitted two amicus briefs in support of plaintiffs.  The Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy & Technology, 
and Professor Eric Goldman (of Santa Clara University School of 
Law) (collectively EFF) submitted an amicus brief in support of 
defendants. 
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948 (1st Cir. 2008).  As the Supreme Court has empha-
sized, this standard “demands more than an unadorned, 
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.  A 
pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formula-
ic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
do.  Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked as-
sertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal cita-
tions and quotation marks omitted). 
Defendants rely primarily on the immunity provid-
ed by Congress in enacting 47 U.S.C. § 230, that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any in-
formation provided by another information content 
provider,” id. § 230(c)(1), and the concomitant preemp-
tion of “cause[s] of action . . . brought . . . under any 
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  
Id. § 230(e)(3).15  There is no dispute that defendants 
are, as the operators of Backpage, providers of an in-
teractive computer service.  Defendants contend that 
because the Doe plaintiffs allege they were harmed by 
the contents of postings that defendants had no part in 
                     
15 The Doe plaintiffs argue that the court should first assess the 
plausibility and sufficiency of the factual allegations relevant to 
each claim before reaching the immunity issue.  However, the enti-
tlement to immunity under section 230 is not only an affirmative 
defense, but also the right to be immune from being sued.  See, e.g., 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 
2003); accord Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (Section 230 “can [] support a motion to dismiss if the 
statute’s barrier to suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”); 
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(same).  As the Supreme Court counsels, a claim of entitlement to 
immunity should be “resolv[ed] . . . at the earliest possible stage in 
litigation.”  Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).   
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creating, the claims fall squarely within Congress’s ex-
emption of interactive computer service providers from 
liability for third-party Internet content. 
Congress enacted section 230 in 1996, while the In-
ternet was still in its infancy.  Congress explained the 
purposes of the law in five pertinent findings: 
(1) The rapidly developing array of In-
ternet and other interactive computer 
services available to individual Ameri-
cans represent an extraordinary ad-
vance in the availability of educational 
and informational resources to our citi-
zens. 
(2) These services offer users a great 
degree of control over the information 
that they receive, as well as the poten-
tial for even greater control in the fu-
ture as technology develops. 
(3) The Internet and other interactive 
computer services offer a forum for a 
true diversity of political discourse, 
unique opportunities for cultural devel-
opment, and myriad avenues for intel-
lectual activity. 
(4) The Internet and other interactive 
computer services have flourished, to 
the benefit of all Americans, with a min-
imum of government regulation. 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying 
on interactive media for a variety of po-
litical, educational, cultural, and enter-
tainment services. 
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47 U.S.C. § 230(a).  Consistent with these findings, sec-
tion 230 reflects the “policy of the United States” 
(1) to promote the continued develop-
ment of the Internet and other interac-
tive computer services and other inter-
active media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competi-
tive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Fed-
eral or State regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of 
technologies which maximize user con-
trol over what information is received 
by individuals, families, and schools who 
use the Internet and other interactive 
computer services; 
(4) to remove disincentives for the de-
velopment and utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies that empower 
parents to restrict their children’s ac-
cess to objectionable or inappropriate 
online material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement 
of Federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, 
and harassment by means of computer. 
Id. § 230(b). 
The Doe plaintiffs argue that because the Internet 
has matured since the enactment of section 230, the 
principal policy consideration that animated Congress 
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(promoting the growth of the Internet by insulating it 
from regulatory restrictions and lawsuits) no longer has 
the assuasive force that it may once have had.  They 
cite the characterization of section 230’s immunity 
guarantee as an affirmative defense in cases like 
Klayman and Ricci as evidence that the courts have 
been whittling back the scope of section 230 immunity 
as the Internet has shed its training wheels.  See 
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28.  The 
argument, however, does not bear scrutiny.  Both the 
Klayman and Ricci courts, whatever the label they 
used to describe section 230’s effect, found the interac-
tive computer service providers at issue to be immune 
from any imputation of liability for third-party speech.  
Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357-1359; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 27-
28.  Moreover, Congress, far from lowering the immuni-
ty bar, ratcheted it up in 2010 by expanding the scope 
of section 230 immunity to preempt the enforcement of 
inconsistent foreign judgments.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
4102(c)(1).16 
The local government amici attempt to repackage 
Backpage as an “information content provider,” an en-
tity that section 230 defines as “any person or entity 
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
or development of information provided through the 
Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  47 
                     
16 Section 4102(c)(1) reads as follows:  “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recog-
nize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation against the pro-
vider of an interactive computer service, as defined in section 230 
of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230) unless the do-
mestic court determines that the judgment would be consistent 
with section 230 if the information that is the subject of such 
judgment had been provided in the United States.”   
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U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  Their ultimate point is that infor-
mation content providers are excluded from the im-
munity granted by section 230.  The amici contend that 
Backpage generates content by:  (1) posting illegal ma-
terials in sponsored ads; (2) stripping metadata from 
posted photos; (3) coaching the crafting of ads by allow-
ing misspellings of suggestive terms; and (4) designing 
the escorts section of the website in such a way as to 
signal to readers that sex with children is sold here.  
The amici argument relies heavily on Fair Hous. Coun-
cil of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).  In that case, the Ninth 
Circuit determined Roommates.com, a roommate 
matching service, to be an “information content provid-
er” shorn of section 230 immunity because it elicited 
information about personal characteristics of users that 
is forbidden by the Fair Housing Act.  Id. at 1169-1170.  
The Court reasoned that 
Roommate’s connection to the discrimi-
natory filtering process is direct and 
palpable:  Roommate designed its 
search and email systems to limit the 
listings available to subscribers based 
on sex, sexual orientation and presence 
of children.  Roommate selected the cri-
teria used to hide listings, and Councils 
allege that the act of hiding certain list-
ings is itself unlawful under the Fair 
Housing Act, which prohibits brokers 
from steering clients in accordance with 
discriminatory preferences. 
Id. 
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To get to its result, the Court in Roommates at-
tempted to draw a line between active control of the 
content of a web posting and the provision of a neutral 
interactive service that simply replicates offending 
third-party matter.17 
If an individual uses an ordinary search 
engine to query for a “white roommate,” 
the search engine has not contributed to 
any alleged unlawfulness in the individ-
ual’s conduct; providing neutral tools to 
carry out what may be unlawful or illicit 
searches does not amount to “develop-
ment” for purposes of the immunity ex-
ception. . . . Similarly, a housing website 
that allows users to specify whether 
they will or will not receive emails by 
means of user-defined criteria might 
help some users exclude email from oth-
er users of a particular race or sex.  
However, that website would be im-
mune, so long as it does not require the 
use of discriminatory criteria.  A web-
site operator who edits user-created 
content – such as by correcting spelling, 
removing obscenity or trimming for 
length – retains his immunity for any il-
legality in the user-created content, 
provided that the edits are unrelated to 
the illegality. 
                     
17 Roommates is one of the few sentinels denying section 230 im-
munity left standing among some 300 cases (as of 2012) that have 
decided the issue.  See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227, 
239 (2012).   
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Id. at 1169 (bold emphasis added).  This latter passage 
lays out the distinction that afforded immunity to 
craigslist.com, an online classifieds forum that also pub-
lished discriminatory housing ads.  “Nothing in the ser-
vice craigslist offers induces anyone to post any partic-
ular listing or express a preference for discrimination; 
for example, craigslist does not offer a lower price to 
people who include discriminatory statements in their 
postings.”  Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights 
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671-
672 (7th Cir. 2008). 
Singly or in the aggregate, the allegedly sordid 
practices of Backpage identified by amici amount to 
neither affirmative participation in an illegal venture 
nor active web content creation.  Nothing in the escorts 
section of Backpage requires users to offer or search 
for commercial sex with children.  The existence of an 
escorts section in a classified ad service, whatever its 
social merits, is not illegal.  The creation of sponsored 
ads with excerpts taken from the original posts reflects 
the illegality (or legality) of the original posts and noth-
ing more.  Similarly, the automatic generation of navi-
gational path names that identify the ads as falling 
within the “escorts” category is not content creation.  
See Seldon v. Magedson, 2014 WL 1456316, at *5-6 (D. 
Ariz. April 15, 2014).  The stripping of metadata from 
photographs is a standard practice among Internet ser-
vice providers.  Hosting anonymous users and accept-
ing payments from anonymous sources in Bitcoins, 
peppercorns, or whatever, might have been made ille-
gal by Congress, but it was not.  Backpage’s passivity 
and imperfect filtering system may be appropriate tar-
gets for criticism, but they do not transform Backpage 
into an information content provider. 
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Although the Doe plaintiffs recognize that defend-
ants did not author the content of the offending ads, see 
Opp’n at 16 (“Plaintiffs’ trafficking claims do not seek to 
‘impute’ to [d]efendants any advertisements created by 
others”), they challenge the breadth of the immunity 
sought by defendants.  Count I alleges a violation of a 
section of the TVPRA, a federal statute that criminal-
izes sex trafficking.  As the Doe plaintiffs note, section 
230 expressly states that “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 
or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 
110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 
18, or any other Federal criminal statute.”  47 U.S.C. § 
230(e)(1) (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs contend that de-
fendants’ business practices, “even if the advertise-
ments had never been posted,” Opp’n at 16, are suffi-
cient to make out a violation of the TVPRA.  Further-
more, according to the Doe plaintiffs, section 230 only 
immunizes “action voluntarily taken in good faith to re-
strict access to or availability of material that the pro-
vider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise ob-
jectionable, whether or not such material is constitu-
tionally protected.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis 
added).  The Doe plaintiffs argue that their claims are 
of a different sort – they allege that defendants have 
intentionally and in bad faith hidden behind ineffectual 
counter-trafficking measures to deflect the scrutiny of 
law enforcement and social services agencies.  Count II 
alleges a violation of the MATA, the Massachusetts an-
alog to the TVPRA.  The Doe plaintiffs argue that, be-
cause claims under the TVPRA are exempt from the 
scope of section 230’s immunity, the claim under MATA 
does not depend on “inconsistent state law” preempted 
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by section 230.  Count III, which presses a claim of un-
fair and deceptive businesses practices under Massa-
chusetts law, is alleged to arise not from the posted ads 
and their contents, but from the architecture of Back-
page itself, which the Doe plaintiffs contend is con-
structed to conceal illegal activity from law enforce-
ment.  Finally, the Doe plaintiffs rely on Congress’s 
stricture that section 230 “shall not be construed to lim-
it or expand any law pertaining to intellectual proper-
ty,” id. § 230(e)(2), as preserving the intellectual prop-
erty claims (unauthorized publicity and copyright in-
fringement).18  I will examine the viability of each count 
in turn. 
Civil Remedy under the TVPRA 
18 U.S.C. § 1595 provides victims of trafficking the 
right to bring a private civil action for restitution 
against “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by 
receiving anything of value from participation in a ven-
ture which that person knew or should have known has 
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.”  The par-
ties dispute whether a civil action authorized by a crim-
inal statute can be construed as “enforcement of . . . a 
Federal criminal statute” exempt from the immunity 
provided by section 230(e)(1).19 
                     
18 Defendants do not rely on section 230 immunity with respect to 
the copyright infringement claim, but contend, to be discussed in-
fra, that it should be dismissed on other grounds. 
19 The Doe plaintiffs, citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th 
Cir. 2009), also contend that their TVPRA claim falls outside of the 
protections of section 230 immunity because section 1595 imposes a 
duty of care on defendants wholly independent of their role as pub-
lishers of speech.  In Barnes, the Ninth Circuit barred a negligent 
undertaking claim under Oregon law that sought to hold Yahoo 
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The Doe plaintiffs maintain that the statutory lan-
guage, “enforce[ing] . . . a Federal criminal statute,” 
implies more than a dependence on criminal prosecu-
tion alone.  See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 
(to “enforce” is “[t]o give force or effect to” or 
“[l]oosely, to compel a person to pay damages for not 
complying with . . . .”).  Further, plaintiffs contend that 
civil actions are frequently authorized as part and par-
cel of the enforcement regime behind criminal statutes.  
See Luka v. Procter & Gamble Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712, 
719 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[C]ivil enforcement mechanisms [] 
permit private parties to sue to enforce statutory pro-
hibitions.”  (emphasis added)).  Plaintiffs also rely on 
                                          
liable for an alleged failure to remove indecent profiles of a plain-
tiff that had been posted by her ex-boyfriend because the claim 
attempted to impose publisher liability on Yahoo for content cre-
ated by a third party.  Id. at 1102-1105 (“The word ‘undertaking,’ 
after all, is meaningless without the following verb.  That is, one 
does not merely undertake; one undertakes to do something.  And 
what is the undertaking that Barnes alleges Yahoo failed to per-
form with due care?  The removal of the indecent profiles that her 
former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s website.  But removing con-
tent is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis 
of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a 
publisher of the content it failed to remove.”).  
The Court did, however, allow a claim of promissory estoppel to 
stand on the allegation that a Director of Communications at Ya-
hoo had contacted plaintiff and promised to remove the offending 
ads, but failed to do so in a timely manner.  Id. at 1107-1109.  “Con-
tract liability here would come not from Yahoo’s publishing con-
duct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be legally obligated to 
do something, which happens to be removal of material from publi-
cation.”  Id. at 1107.  There is no claim by the Doe plaintiffs that 
any such assurance was given to them by Backpage.  As Barnes 
illustrates, the existence of a statutory remedy without more does 
not give rise mirabile dictu to a tort duty.  If it did, there would no 
need to create such a remedy in the first place.   
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dicta in Nieman v. Versuslaw, Inc., 2012 WL 3201931, 
at *9 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012), surmising that section 230 
“arguably . . . may not be used to bar a civil RICO claim 
because that would impair the enforcement of a Feder-
al criminal statute.”  
Defendants, for their part, point out that courts 
have consistently rejected this argument in a section 
230 immunity context.  In Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL 
3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006), the court held that 
Yahoo could not be held civilly liable for allegedly 
knowingly hosting child pornography on a user site 
styled as the Candyman e-group.  The Magistrate 
Judge examined “th[is] issue of first impression” in 
scholarly detail that is worth quoting at length.  Id., at 
*3. 
The plain text of the statute establishes 
that the 230(e)(1) exception does not en-
compass private civil claims.  As argued 
by Defendant, the common definition of 
the term “criminal,” as well as its use in 
the context of Section 230(e)(1), specifi-
cally excludes and is distinguished from 
civil claims.  The term “criminal” is de-
fined as “[c]onnected with the admin-
istration of penal justice.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 302; see also American Her-
itage Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage 430 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “crim-
inal” as “[r]elating to the administration 
of penal law”).  The term “civil” is de-
fined as follows: “[o]f or relating to pri-
vate rights and remedies that are 
sought by action or suit, as distinct from 
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criminal proceedings.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 262 (emphasis added).  In 
addition, Congress’ use of the word “en-
forcement” in Section 230(e)(1) again 
confirms that the exception refers to 
governmental action, not civil actions by 
a private litigant.  
Congress did not bifurcate any statutes 
as asserted by Plaintiffs.  Rather, as 
noted by Defendant, it preserved the 
ability of law enforcement officials to en-
force the federal criminal laws to their 
fullest extent while at the same time 
eliminating the ability of private plain-
tiffs to pursue service-provider defend-
ants.  Given the complexity of Title 18 
and the availability of civil remedies in 
statutes throughout the criminal code, 
Congress achieved its intended result 
using simple language making it clear 
that Section 230’s limits on civil liability 
would not affect governmental enforce-
ment of federal criminal laws.  
As noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ invo-
cation of Section 230(e)(1) rests on their 
generalized policy arguments rather 
than the text of the statute.  Plaintiffs’ 
core argument appears to be that Sec-
tion 230(e)(1) must exempt civil claims 
under the child pornography statutes 
because child pornography is “not to be 
tolerated” and “[i]f the prospect of civil 
liability provides a disincentive for en-
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gaging in child pornography over and 
above that provided by the prospect of 
fines and jail time, then that is a good 
thing.”  
Child pornography obviously is intoler-
able, but civil immunity for interactive 
service providers does not constitute 
“tolerance” of child pornography any 
more than civil immunity from the nu-
merous other forms of harmful content 
that third parties may create constitutes 
approval of that content.  Section 230 
does not limit anyone’s ability to bring 
criminal or civil actions against the ac-
tual wrongdoers, the individuals who ac-
tually create and consume the child por-
nography.  Here, both the neighbor 
[who created the child pornography] and 
the moderator of the Candyman web 
site have been prosecuted and are serv-
ing sentences in federal prison.  Fur-
ther, the section 230(e)(1) exemption 
permits law enforcement authorities to 
bring criminal charges against even in-
teractive service providers in the event 
that they themselves actually violate 
federal criminal laws.  
Regarding civil liability, however, Con-
gress decided not to allow private liti-
gants to bring civil claims based on their 
own beliefs that a service provider’s ac-
tions violated the criminal laws.  As De-
fendant explained in its briefing, the 
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reason is evident.  If civil liability were 
possible, the incentive to bring a civil 
claim for the settlement value could be 
immense, even if a plaintiff’s claim was 
without merit.  Even if it ultimately 
prevailed, the service provider would 
face intense public scrutiny and sub-
stantial expense.  Given the millions of 
communications that a service provider 
such as Defendant enables, the service 
provider could find itself a defendant in 
numerous such cases.  Congress deter-
mined that it wanted to eliminate the 
resulting disincentives to the develop-
ment of vibrant and diverse services in-
volving third-party communication, 
while maintaining the ability of criminal 
prosecutions by the government for vio-
lations of federal criminal law.  In sum, 
Congress did intend to treat civil and 
criminal claims differently and carefully 
crafted Section 230(e)(1) to achieve ex-
actly that result.  Plaintiffs’ claim, alt-
hough novel, is untenable and without 
merit. 
Id., at *21-22.  
The District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
opinion, also noting that 
[t]he legislative history [] buttresses the 
Congressional policy against civil liabil-
ity for internet service providers.  One 
key proponent of an amendment con-
taining the language of § 230 at issue 
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explained that “the existing legal sys-
tem provides a massive disincentive for 
the people who might best help us con-
trol the Internet to do so.”  141 Cong. 
Rec. H8469.  Several legislators identi-
fied “obscenity” in particular as material 
that could be more freely regulated as a 
result of the immunity provided by the 
statute.  Another proponent noted that 
“[t]here is no way that any of [the inter-
net service providers], like Prodigy, can 
take the responsibility to edit out infor-
mation that is going to be coming in to 
them from all manner of sources onto 
their bulletin board. . . . We are talking 
about . . . thousands of pages of infor-
mation every day, and to have that im-
position imposed on them is wrong.”  Id. 
at H8471.  The House approved the 
amendment by a vote of 410 to 4.  Id. at 
H8478. 
Id., at *4.  The court concluded that on the basis of this 
legislative history, “Congress decided not to allow pri-
vate litigants to bring civil claims based on their own 
beliefs that a service provider’s actions violated the 
criminal laws.”  Id., at *5. 
In M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 
LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), the court 
adopted the reasoning of Bates and rejected the identi-
cal argument from plaintiff, a victim of child sex traf-
ficking, that section 230 carved out an exemption for 
the civil claim that she had brought against Backpage 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1595.  Id. at 1055-1056.  Similarly, in 
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Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261 (D.N.J. July 31, 
2014), the court rejected plaintiff’s effort to claim pri-
vate redress for defendants’ alleged criminal conspiracy 
to violate his rights.  Id., at *8.  “Even if Plaintiff had 
alleged any facts to sustain this claim, the CDA excep-
tion for federal criminal statutes applies to government 
prosecutions, not to civil private rights of action under 
stat[utes] with criminal aspects.”  Id.  
Although the Doe plaintiffs challenge this line of 
cases as “flawed,” the court is persuaded that criminal 
and civil actions differ in kind and that section 230 ex-
empts only criminal prosecutions.  Section 1595 itself 
recognizes that although a private right of action may 
be complementary to government interests in combat-
ing trafficking, a civil action primarily vindicates pri-
vate interests and must take a back seat to a criminal 
prosecution.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) (“Any civil ac-
tion filed under this section shall be stayed during the 
pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same 
occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.”).  The 
court also finds persuasive amici EFF’s argument that 
only criminal prosecutions are exempted from section 
230’s immunity because they are subject to the filter of 
prosecutorial discretion and a heightened standard of 
proof, making them less likely to have a chilling effect 
on the freedom of online speech.20 
                     
20 Defendants also contend that plaintiffs fail to make out a case 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 because they do not allege that defendants 
shared the traffickers’ criminal intent.  Plaintiffs counter that sec-
tion 1595 imposes liability not only for aiding and abetting, but 
more broadly for “participation in a venture which that person 
knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of 
this chapter.”  Id. § 1595(a) (emphasis added).  The court need not 
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The Doe plaintiffs’ next argument, that section 230 
only immunizes “good faith” efforts to restrict access to 
offensive materials, has also failed to find support in the 
decided cases.  Section 203(c)(1) states that “[n]o pro-
vider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”  
Section 230(c)(2) further provides that 
[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on 
account of –  
(A) any action voluntarily taken 
in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider 
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is consti-
tutionally protected; or  
(B) any action taken to enable or 
make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means 
to restrict access to material described 
in paragraph (1). 
Where section 230(c)(1) exempts an interactive 
service provider from liability for publishing third-
party content, section 230(c)(2) also immunizes these 
providers from liability for actions taken in good faith 
to restrict offensive content. 
                                          
decide this issue because it holds that this claim is preempted by 
section 230 immunity.   
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[Section] 230(c)(1) contains no explicit 
exception for impermissible editorial 
motive, whereas § 230(c)(2) does contain 
a “good faith” requirement for the im-
munity provided therein.  That § 
230(c)(2) expressly provides for a good 
faith element omitted from § 230(c)(1) 
indicates that Congress intended not to 
import a subjective intent/good faith 
limitation into § 230(c)(1).  “[W]here 
Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another . . . , it is generally presumed 
that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”  Keene Corp. v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 [] (1993).  Ac-
cordingly, the text of the two subsec-
tions of § 230(c) indicates that (c)(1)’s 
immunity applies regardless of whether 
the publisher acts in good faith. 
Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011 WL 5079526, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 26, 2011), aff’d, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014).21 
Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices 
The Doe plaintiffs contend that the claim for unfair 
and deceptive business practices under the Massachu-
setts Consumer Protection Act, Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 9, 
survives section 230 immunity because it does not de-
                     
21 Because the CDA immunizes Backpage from private litigants 
seeking redress under civil law, the parallel state law claim under 
the MATA is necessarily inconsistent with, and therefore 
preempted by, the CDA.   
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pend on the content of the advertisements themselves, 
but rather on the “deceptive” design of Backpage.  
Without the offending ads, however, no nexus would 
exist between Backpage and the harms suffered by the 
Doe plaintiffs.  Their theory – that absent the permis-
sive website design and imperfect filtering, their pimps 
would not have trafficked them or, if they had attempt-
ed to do so, law enforcement would have scrutinized 
Backpage more closely and would possibly have inter-
vened to prevent their injuries – is too speculative to 
fall as a matter of law within the penumbra of reasona-
bly foreseeability.  
Moreover, courts have repeatedly rejected this 
“entire website” theory as inconsistent with the sub-
stance and policy of section 230.  In Universal 
Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 
2007), the First Circuit refused to hold Lycos (a search 
engine) liable for the “construct and operation” of its 
website.  Id. at 422.  “Lycos’s decision not to reduce 
misinformation by changing its web site policies was as 
much an editorial decision with respect to that misin-
formation as a decision not to delete a particular post-
ing.  Section 230 immunity does not depend on the form 
that decision takes.”  Id.; see also StubHub, Inc., 219 
N.C. App. at 245 (rejecting the “entire website” ap-
proach in determining whether the Internet ticket 
marketplace may be held responsible for scalpers’ un-
fair or deceptive trade practices); Nemet Chevrolet, 
Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 257 
(4th Cir. 2009) (finding a “structure and design” ap-
proach inapplicable where, unlike in Roommates, the 
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design of website did not “require[] users to input ille-
gal content as a necessary condition of use.”).22 
Also problematic is the suggestion that either 
knowledge or tacit encouragement of illegal content 
(but not the content itself) can be the basis for interac-
tive web services liability.  “It is, by now, well estab-
lished that notice of the unlawful nature of the infor-
mation provided is not enough to make it the service 
provider’s own speech.”  Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420; see al-
so Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 
1997) (“The simple fact of notice surely cannot trans-
form one from an original publisher to a distributor in 
the eyes of the law.”).  Moreover, 
there is simply no authority for the 
proposition that [encouraging the 
publication of defamatory content] 
makes the website operator re-
sponsible, in whole or in part, for 
the ‘creation or development’ of 
every post on the site. . . . Unless 
Congress amends the [CDA], it is 
legally (although perhaps not ethi-
cally) beside the point whether de-
fendants refuse to remove the ma-
                     
22 Court have also rejected consumer protection claims under sec-
tion 230(c)(1) that seek to hold interactive service providers liable 
for third-party content.  See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421-422 (Flor-
ida securities and cyberstalking laws); Hinton v. Amazon.com, 
2014 WL 6982628, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 9, 2014) (Mississippi Con-
sumer Protection Act); Obado, 2014 WL 3778261, at *1 (New Jer-
sey Consumer Fraud Act); Goddard v. Google, 2008 WL 5245490, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (California Unfair Competition 
Law).   
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terial, or how they might use it to 
their advantage. 
Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 
476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted, 
ellipsis in original).  Indeed, 
an encouragement test would inflate the 
meaning of “development” to the point 
of eclipsing the immunity from publish-
er-liability that Congress established.  
Many websites not only allow but also 
actively invite and encourage users to 
post particular types of content.  Some 
of this content will be unwelcome to 
others – e.g., unfavorable reviews of 
consumer products and services, allega-
tions of price gouging, complaints of 
fraud on consumers, reports of bed bugs, 
collections of cease-and-desist notices 
relating to online speech.  And much of 
this content is commented upon by the 
website operators who make the forum 
available.  Indeed, much of it is “adopt-
ed” by website operators, gathered into 
reports, and republished online.  Under 
an encouragement test of development, 
these websites would lose the immunity 
under the CDA and be subject to heck-
lers’ suits aimed at the publisher.  
Moreover, under the district court’s 
rule, courts would then have to decide 
what constitutes “encouragement” in 
order to determine immunity under the 
CDA – a concept that is certainly more 
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difficult to define and apply than the 
Ninth Circuit’s material contribution 
test.  See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.  Con-
gress envisioned an uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open internet, see § 230(a)(1)-
(5), but the muddiness of an encourage-
ment rule would cloud that vision.  Ac-
cordingly, other courts have declined to 
hold that websites were not entitled to 
the immunity furnished by the CDA be-
cause they selected and edited content 
for display, thereby encouraging the 
posting of similar content. 
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 
398, 414-415 (6th Cir. 2014).23 
Right of Publicity  
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A, provides 
that  
[a]ny person whose name, portrait or 
picture is used within the common-
wealth for advertising purposes or for 
the purposes of trade without his writ-
ten consent may bring a civil action in 
the superior court against the person so 
using his name, portrait or picture, to 
prevent and restrain the use thereof; 
                     
23 Defendants also argue that the Chapter 93A claim, in so far as it 
is based on alleged misrepresentations to law enforcement and 
social services agencies, lacks an essential foundational element 
because law enforcement and social services agencies have no con-
nection in a commercial context to defendants as “consumers” of 
goods and services.   
63a 
 
 
and may recover damages for any inju-
ries sustained by reason of such use.  
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 provides in almost identical 
language that 
[a]ny person whose name, portrait, or 
picture is used within the state for 
commercial purposes without his or her 
written consent may bring an action in 
the superior court against the person so 
using his or her name, portrait, or pic-
ture to prevent and restrain the use 
thereof, and may recover damages for 
any injuries sustained by reason of such 
use. 
Accepting, dubitante, the Doe plaintiffs’ assertion that 
the right to publicity constitutes an intellectual proper-
ty claim exempt from immunity under section 230,24 the 
                     
24 Although certain publicity rights are akin to “intellectual proper-
ty” rights, a person’s image is not a “product of the human intel-
lect.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  “[T]he right of pub-
licity flows from the right to privacy,” Alvarez Guedes v. Marcano 
Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278 (D.P.R. 2001) (citing numerous 
cases), which is an intangible right of a different nature.  Despite 
the Doe plaintiffs’ attorney’s contention at oral argument that a 
photograph may be copyrightable, it does not follow that the un-
derlying image is ipso facto protectable under intellectual proper-
ty law.  See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 
528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Recognizing that Oscar 
Wilde’s inimitable visage does not belong, or ‘owe its origins’ to 
any photographer, the Supreme Court noted that photographs 
may well sometimes lack originality and are thus not per se copy-
rightable. . . . [P]hotographs are copyrightable, if only to the ex-
tent of their original depiction of the subject.  Wilde’s image is not 
copyrightable; but to the extent a photograph reflects the photog-
rapher’s decisions regarding pose, positioning, background, light-
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court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs have not 
pled plausible claims for unauthorized use of their im-
ages.  Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants used their 
images to extract any direct benefit (such as featuring 
plaintiffs on advertisements for Backpage).  Rather, the 
allegation is that defendants benefitted incidentally 
from the fee charged for posting advertisements with 
the Doe plaintiffs’ pictures in the escorts section of the 
website.  The argument, however, has been explicitly 
rejected by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court.25 
[T]the crucial distinction under G.L. c. 
214, s 3A, must be between situations in 
which the defendant makes an incidental 
use of the plaintiff’s name, portrait or 
picture and those in which the defend-
ant uses the plaintiff’s name, portrait or 
                                          
ing, shading, and the like, those elements can be said to ‘owe their 
origins’ to the photographer, making the photograph copyrighta-
ble, at least to that extent.”), citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. 
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). Courts also disagree as to wheth-
er state law intellectual property claims are exempted under sec-
tion 230.  Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 
1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In the absence of a definition from Congress, 
we construe the term “intellectual property” to mean ‘federal in-
tellectual property.’”) with Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 
F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008) (“[Section] 230(e)(2) applies 
simply to ‘any law pertaining to intellectual property,’ not just fed-
eral law.”).   
25 “[A]s a federal court considering state law claims, we must apply 
the state’s law on substantive issues and ‘we are bound by the 
teachings of the state’s highest court.’”  Phoung Luc v. Wyndham 
Mgmt. Corp., 496 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 2007), citing N. Am. Special-
ty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2001).   
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picture deliberately to exploit its value 
for advertising or trade purposes. 
Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 749 
(1980).  “‘The fact that the defendant is engaged in the 
business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out 
of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not 
enough to make the incidental publication a commercial 
use of the name or likeness.’”  Id., quoting Nelson v. 
Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1977) (in turn 
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d 
(1977)); see also Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254 Serv. 
Employees Int’l Union, 62 F. Supp. 2d 483, 506 (D.R.I. 
1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 
remanded sub nom. Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254, 
Serv. Employees Int’l Union AFL-CIO, 241 F.3d 82 
(1st Cir. 2001) (“The Rhode Island legislature borrowed 
the Privacy Act’s scheme of four privacy torts, includ-
ing the tort of false light, from the doctrine of privacy 
torts promulgated by the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. See Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 479 (D.R.I. 
1999); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B-E (estab-
lishing the four privacy torts).  Accordingly, Rhode Is-
land courts have often turned to the Restatement as an 
authority on the matter of privacy torts.”). 
Copyright Infringement 
Jane Doe No. 3 obtained a registration for her pho-
tograph on December 18, 2014, after this lawsuit was 
filed.  Although registration is not a jurisdictional pre-
requisite of bringing a suit for copyright infringement, 
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 
(2010), it is a “condition precedent for obtaining certain 
remedies, such as statutory damages and attorneys’ 
fees.”  Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 
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2005); see also 17 U.S.C § 412 (“[N]o award of statutory 
damages or of attorney’s fees . . . shall be made for – (1) 
any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work 
commenced before the effective date of its registra-
tion.”).  
The only recovery remaining open to Jane Doe No. 
3 is compensatory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504.  Sec-
tion 504 permits recovery of “the actual damages suf-
fered by [] her as a result of the infringement, and any 
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the in-
fringement and are not taken into account in computing 
the actual damages.”  With respect to the latter, Jane 
Doe No. 3 alleges that “[t]he Backpage Defendants de-
rive a financial benefit directly attributable to the pub-
lic display of such photographs by virtue of the pay-
ment of fees by the pimps and traffickers to Back-
page.com.”  SAC ¶ 139.  However, she may only recov-
er profits from defendants that are causally linked to 
specific acts of infringement.  See On Davis v. The Gap, 
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159-161 (2d Cir. 2001).  Here no plau-
sible link exists between defendants’ generalized prof-
its and any common-law copyright vesting in Jane Doe 
No. 3’s photo for the simple reason that the fee for post-
ing an ad is the same whether or not it includes a pho-
tograph.  Jane Doe No. 3 does not allege that she suf-
fered any loss of revenues or licensing fees for her pho-
to as a result of the infringement (nor does she allege 
that the protectable elements of the photo, see n.12 su-
pra, have any market value).  
Because she does not plead any redressable dam-
ages, Jane Doe No. 3’s copyright infringement claim 
must also be dismissed.  
*** 
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To avoid any misunderstanding, let me make it 
clear that the court is not unsympathetic to the tragic 
plight described by Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and 
Jane Doe No. 3.  Nor does it regard the sexual traffick-
ing of children as anything other than an abhorrent 
evil.  Finally, the court is not naïve – I am fully aware 
that sex traffickers and other purveyors of illegal 
wares ranging from drugs to pornography exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the Internet as a marketing tool.  
Whether one agrees with its stated policy or not (a pol-
icy driven not simply by economic concerns, but also by 
technological and constitutional considerations), Con-
gress has made the determination that the balance be-
tween suppression of trafficking and freedom of ex-
pression should be struck in favor of the latter in so far 
as the Internet is concerned.  Putting aside the moral 
judgment that one might pass on Backpage’s business 
practices, this court has no choice but to adhere to the 
law that Congress has seen fit to enact. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is AL-
LOWED.  The Clerk is directed to enter judgment ac-
cordingly and close this case.  
SO ORDERED.  
/s/ Richard G. Stearns 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
JUDGE 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
___________ 
No. 15-1724 
JANE DOE (1); JANE DOE (2); JANE DOE (3), A 
MINOR CHILD, BY HER PARENTS AND NEXT 
FRIENDS, SAM LOE AND SARA LOE 
Plaintiffs - Appellants 
v. 
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC; CAMARILLO HOLDINGS, 
LLC, f/k/a Village Voice Media Holding, LLC; NEW 
TIMES MEDIA, LLC 
Defendants – Appellees 
___________ 
Before 
Howard, Chief Judge, 
Souter,* Associate Justice, 
Torruella, Selya, Lynch, Thompson, 
Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges. 
___________ 
ORDER OF COURT 
___________ 
Entered: May 3, 2016 
Pursuant to First Circuit Internal Operating Pro-
cedure X(C), the petition for rehearing en banc has also 
                     
* Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, sitting by designation. 
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been treated as a petition for rehearing before the orig-
inal panel.  The petition for rehearing having been de-
nied by the panel of judges who decided the case, and 
the petition for rehearing en banc having been submit-
ted to the active judges of this court and a majority of 
the judges not having voted that the case be heard en 
banc, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing and 
petition for rehearing en banc be denied. 
By the Court: 
/s/ Margaret Carter, Clerk 
cc: 
John T. Montgomery 
Dara Ann Reppucci 
Ching-Lee Fukuda 
Aaron M. Katz 
Christine Ezzell Singer 
Jessica Lucia Soto 
Rebecca C. Ellis 
Robert A. Bertsche 
Jeffrey J. Pyle 
James C. Grant 
Ambika Kumar Doran 
Genevieve C. Nadeau 
Mark David Lipton 
Stacey J. Rappaport 
Michael A. Rogoff 
Jenna A. Hudson
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APPENDIX D 
18 U.S.C. § 1591 
§ 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or 
coercion  
(a) Whoever knowingly—  
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or 
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, 
transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, 
patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or 
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of 
value, from participation in a venture which has en-
gaged in an act described in violation of paragraph 
(1), knowing, or, except where the act constituting 
the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reck-
less disregard of the fact, that means of force, 
threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsec-
tion (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be 
used to cause the person to engage in a commercial 
sex act, or that the person has not attained the age 
of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a com-
mercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b). 
(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) 
is—  
(1) if the offense was effected by means of force, 
threats of force, fraud, or coercion described in sub-
section (e)(2), or by any combination of such means, 
or if the person recruited, enticed, harbored, trans-
ported, provided, obtained, advertised, patronized, 
or solicited had not attained the age of 14 years at 
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the time of such offense, by a fine under this title 
and imprisonment for any term of years not less 
than 15 or for life; or 
(2) if the offense was not so effected, and the person 
recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, 
obtained, advertised, patronized, or solicited had at-
tained the age of 14 years but had not attained the 
age of 18 years at the time of such offense, by a fine 
under this title and imprisonment for not less than 
10 years or for life. 
(c) In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the 
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the 
person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, 
provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited, 
the Government need not prove that the defendant 
knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the per-
son had not attained the age of 18 years. 
(d) Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any 
way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this 
section, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for a 
term not to exceed 20 years, or both. 
(e) In this section:  
(1) The term “abuse or threatened abuse of law or 
legal process” means the use or threatened use of a 
law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, 
or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for 
which the law was not designed, in order to exert 
pressure on another person to cause that person to 
take some action or refrain from taking some action. 
(2) The term “coercion” means—  
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(A) threats of serious harm to or physical re-
straint against any person; 
(B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to 
cause a person to believe that failure to perform 
an act would result in serious harm to or physical 
restraint against any person; or 
(C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the 
legal process. 
(3) The term “commercial sex act” means any sex 
act, on account of which anything of value is given to 
or received by any person. 
(4) The term “serious harm” means any harm, 
whether physical or nonphysical, including psycho-
logical, financial, or reputational harm, that is suffi-
ciently serious, under all the surrounding circum-
stances, to compel a reasonable person of the same 
background and in the same circumstances to per-
form or to continue performing commercial sexual 
activity in order to avoid incurring that harm. 
(5) The term “venture” means any group of two or 
more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a 
legal entity. 
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APPENDIX E 
18 U.S.C. § 1595 
§ 1595. Civil remedy 
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this 
chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator 
(or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by re-
ceiving anything of value from participation in a ven-
ture which that person knew or should have known has 
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an ap-
propriate district court of the United States and may 
recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees. 
(b)(1) Any civil action filed under this section shall be 
stayed during the pendency of any criminal action aris-
ing out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is 
the victim. 
(2) In this subsection, a ‘‘criminal action’’ includes 
investigation and prosecution and is pending until 
final adjudication in the trial court. 
(c) No action may be maintained under this section un-
less it is commenced not later than 10 years after the 
cause of action arose.
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APPENDIX F 
47 U.S.C. § 230 
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of 
offensive material 
(a)  Findings The Congress finds the following:  
(1)   The rapidly developing array of Internet and 
other interactive computer services available to in-
dividual Americans represent an extraordinary ad-
vance in the availability of educational and informa-
tional resources to our citizens.  
(2)   These services offer users a great degree of 
control over the information that they receive, as 
well as the potential for even greater control in the 
future as technology develops.  
(3)   The Internet and other interactive computer 
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural devel-
opment, and myriad avenues for intellectual activi-
ty.  
(4)   The Internet and other interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Ameri-
cans, with a minimum of government regulation.  
(5)   Increasingly Americans are relying on interac-
tive media for a variety of political, educational, cul-
tural, and entertainment services.  
(b)  Policy It is the policy of the United States—  
(1)   to promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services 
and other interactive media;  
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(2)   to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation;  
(3)   to encourage the development of technologies 
which maximize user control over what information 
is received by individuals, families, and schools who 
use the Internet and other interactive computer 
services;  
(4)   to remove disincentives for the development 
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies 
that empower parents to restrict their children’s ac-
cess to objectionable or inappropriate online mate-
rial; and  
(5)   to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal 
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in ob-
scenity, stalking, and harassment by means of com-
puter.  
(c)  Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material   
(1)  Treatment of publisher or speaker   
No provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
(2)  Civil liability No provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be held liable on account 
of—  
(A)   any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
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lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, har-
assing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected; 
or  
(B)   any action taken to enable or make availa-
ble to information content providers or others 
the technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1).[1]   
(d)  Obligations of interactive computer service   
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the 
time of entering an agreement with a customer for the 
provision of interactive computer service and in a man-
ner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such 
customer that parental control protections (such as 
computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are 
commercially available that may assist the customer in 
limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. 
Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with 
access to information identifying, current providers of 
such protections. 
(e)  Effect on other laws   
(1)  No effect on criminal law   
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair 
the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, 
chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to 
sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any 
other Federal criminal statute. 
(2)  No effect on intellectual property law   
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property. 
(3)  State law   
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent 
any State from enforcing any State law that is con-
sistent with this section. No cause of action may be 
brought and no liability may be imposed under any 
State or local law that is inconsistent with this sec-
tion. 
(4)  No effect on communications privacy law   
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit 
the application of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made 
by such Act, or any similar State law. 
(f)  Definitions As used in this section:  
(1)  Internet   
The term “Internet” means the international com-
puter network of both Federal and non-Federal in-
teroperable packet switched data networks. 
(2)  Interactive computer service   
The term “interactive computer service” means any 
information service, system, or access software pro-
vider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including spe-
cifically a service or system that provides access to 
the Internet and such systems operated or services 
offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
(3)  Information content provider   
The term “information content provider” means any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interac-
tive computer service. 
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(4)  Access software provider The term “access 
software provider” means a provider of software 
(including client or server software), or enabling 
tools that do any one or more of the following:  
(A)   filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;  
(B)   pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or  
(C)   transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, 
search, subset, organize, reorganize, or trans-
late content.
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APPENDIX G 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50 
§ 50. Trafficking of persons for sexual servitude; traf-
ficking of persons under 18 years for sexual servitude; 
trafficking by business entities; penalties; tort actions 
brought by victims 
(a) Whoever knowingly: (i) subjects, or attempts to sub-
ject, or recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides 
or obtains by any means, or attempts to recruit, entice, 
harbor, transport, provide or obtain by any means, an-
other person to engage in commercial sexual activity, a 
sexually-explicit performance or the production of un-
lawful pornography in violation of chapter 272, or caus-
es a person to engage in commercial sexual activity, a 
sexually-explicit performance or the production of un-
lawful pornography in violation of said chapter 272; or 
(ii) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of val-
ue, as a result of a violation of clause (i), shall be guilty 
of the crime of trafficking of persons for sexual servi-
tude and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not less than 5 years but not more than 
20 years and by a fine of not more than $25,000. Such 
sentence shall not be reduced to less than 5 years, or 
suspended, nor shall any person convicted under this 
section be eligible for probation, parole, work release or 
furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence for 
good conduct until he shall have served 5 years of such 
sentence. No prosecution commenced under this section 
shall be continued without a finding or placed on file.  
(b) Whoever commits the crime of trafficking of per-
sons for sexual servitude upon a person under 18 years 
of age shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for life or for any term of years, but not less than 
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5 years. No person convicted under this subsection 
shall be eligible for probation, parole, work release or 
furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence for 
good conduct until he shall have served 5 years of such 
sentence.  
(c) A business entity that commits trafficking of per-
sons for sexual servitude shall be punished by a fine of 
not more than $1,000,000.  
(d) A victim of subsection (a) may bring an action in 
tort in the superior court in any county wherein a viola-
tion of subsection (a) occurred, where the plaintiff re-
sides or where the defendant resides or has a place of 
business. Any business entity that knowingly aids or is 
a joint venturer in trafficking of persons for sexual ser-
vitude shall be civilly liable for an offense under this 
section.  
 
